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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the kenotic motif in the theology of 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, particularly in light of his concern to protect human agency. 
This dissertation argues that Balthasar views kenotic spiritual practice as the pathway to 
achieve true human agency. This kenotic pathway to agency is placed in contrast to 
Balthasar’s concept of original sin as an attempt by humanity to achieve agency on their 
own terms. The narrative of original sin results in two possible outcomes for Balthasar: a 
spiritual pathway toward the absorption of the self, which results in the annihilation of 
the self or, the autonomy of the self is emphasized to the degree that self-actualization 
becomes the goal of the spiritual journey and other humans are seen as obstacles to self-
realization. This project explores the themes of kenosis within the doctrine of the 
Incarnation and Trinity as the solution to understanding human agency and as the answer 
to original sin in and through the Incarnation. The Christological and Trinitarian shape of 
sainthood and spirituality are explored in the final two chapters. Balthasar’s treatment of 
St. John of the Cross, St. Thérèse of Lisieux, and Elisabeth of the Trinity are examples of 
how the kenotic motif is revealed in the lives of the saints. The final chapter looks at 
Balthasar’s spirituality as thoroughly kenotic and that this kenotic activity cannot be 
systematized into a universal ethical or spiritual model; rather, it is enacted through 
discernment. This discernment is based on the norm of the gospel as “hard sayings” and 
as “good news.” Each individual human being is invited to take on a unique mission, 
 ix 
which forms them into a theological person, those providing a deep and real sense of 
human agency.  The dissertation ends with a speculative interaction of Balthasar’s 
kenotic thought with three other scholars, Edith Wyschogrod, Sarah Coakley, and Sallie 
McFague, in order to offer a glimpse into future discussions of kenosis in contemporary 
theology.
 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE BOUNDARIES OF KENOSIS 
In Matthew 16:24-25, Jesus says to his disciples, “If anyone wishes to come after 
Me, he must deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Me. For whoever wishes to 
save his life will lose it; but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it.” Some strands 
of traditional Christianity interpret this (and other biblical passages like it) in a manner 
that encourages self-abnegation and personal trauma in the name of Christian 
discipleship. In early Christianity, those tortured and martyred Christians were viewed 
with particular reverence by the church. One vivid and graphic example of this 
phenomenon of self-abnegation occurs in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch. Apprehended 
by the Roman government and on the way to face martyrdom in Rome, he wrote several 
letters to Christian churches during his journey. In his Letter to the Romans he writes:  
I am writing to all the Churches and I enjoin all, that I am dying willingly for 
God’s sake, if only you do not prevent it. I beg you, do not do me an untimely 
kindness. Allow me to be eaten by the beasts, which are my way of reaching to 
God. I am God’s wheat, and I am to be ground by the teeth of wild beasts, so that 
I may become the pure bread of Christ.
1
 
 
Ignatius viewed his certain death at the hands of the Romans to be of positive value even 
to the point that he did not want intervention on his behalf. In addition to the clear 
statements that Ignatius envisioned his martyrdom as a profoundly personal and 
volitional act, he also believes that his actions and his death will ultimately take on a 
christological significance. He hopes to become “the pure bread of Christ.”  This is a 
                                                          
 
1
 Ignatius of Antioch, “Letter to the Romans,” in The Early Christian Fathers, ed. Cyril 
Richardson (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 104. 
2 
 
significant reference to the Eucharist and its relation to Jesus’ crucifixion. Ignatius is 
emulating a christological concept of self-sacrifice, interpreting his own agency through 
the lens of the Incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus himself. In this dissertation I 
will call this constellation of meaning the “kenotic motif” or principle.2 Kenosis is a 
Greek term that means emptying. This term has been applied to the Incarnation, mainly, 
in Christian history. However, Christian spirituality, operating in accordance with the 
idea that we should model our lives after Christ, has used words like self-surrender, 
mortification, indifference, and apatheia, to describe a specific experience of emptying 
that takes place within the Christian discipleship.  
The Problem 
 
The sentiments of Ignatius are not an isolated instance in Christian history. The 
impact of the kenotic structure of spirituality and Christology has continued in a variety 
of forms and expressions. In the twentieth century, with the collapse of the 
Enlightenment ideal of “progress,” two world wars, and the horrors of the Holocaust, 
Western theology has become preoccupied with suffering, theodicy, and human agency. 
Genocide, imperialism, the collapse of metaphysics, the feminist and civil rights 
movements, and the rise of the so-called hermeneutics of suspicion and Marxist theories 
of class struggle have ushered in a new concern in postmodern Christianity in light of 
human flourishing.  
These events and intellectual movements have heightened and altered some of the 
tensions present in the kenotic motif. It has become more commonplace to posit that this 
                                                          
 
2
 Terms such as “self-sacrifice, self-giving, abandonment, kenosis, and self-emptying” will be 
treated as very similar in meaning. For a discussion on these terms and possible ways of distinguishing 
between them, see Ruth Groenhout, “Kenosis and Feminist Theory,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: 
The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 290-312. 
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kenotic theme places the suffering and sacrifice of the cross directly in contact with the 
divine being itself, leading some theologians to claim God suffers alongside us in 
solidarity.
3
  There are also theological perspectives that use the motif of kenosis as a 
spiritual path to freedom from oppression and enhanced personal agency. Sarah Coakley, 
for example, argues for a version of kenosis based in vulnerable contemplation, believing 
that a reformulated notion of traditional forms of kenosis is “crucial for my understanding 
of a specifically Christian form of feminism.”4 Rosemary Ruether also affirms the idea of 
a “kenosis of patriarchy,”5 a subversive indictment against all hierarchical and patriarchal 
ways of living. Oliver Davies calls it “dispossesive intentionality” and believes that 
society would crumble without the practice of self-emptying.
6
 
Yet, other contemporary thinkers have grave concerns about this kenotic model of 
God and the spiritual ethos of Christians such as Ignatius of Antioch. It may come as no 
surprise to those familiar with the postmodern situation that language of self-emptying 
and sacrifice come under heavy suspicion. Is it not this type of rhetoric and metaphor that 
has encouraged submissive and self-destructive behavior, often encouraging the 
oppressed to stay in unjust and abusive situations? Does not self-sacrifice turn human 
beings into passive shells of humanity, drawing victimization and suffering like a 
magnet? Certainly, some postmodern theologians believe that the answer to these 
                                                          
3
 For a brief description of the historical factors that contributed to this theological paradigm shift, 
see Ronald Goetz, “The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy,” Christian Century, April 16 1986, 
385-389. 
 
4
 Sarah Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion: On the Representation of “Vulnerability” in Christian 
Feminist Writing,” in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy, and Gender (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2002), 5. 
 
5
 Rosemary R. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1993), 137. 
 
6
 Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics and the Renewal of Tradition (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 16-17. The first two chapters are grouped under the heading “Kenotic 
Ontology,” in which Davies uses kenotic themes to describe ontology and the self.  
4 
 
questions is “yes.”  Daphne Hampson believes that in the case of women, “the theme of 
self-emptying and self-abnegation is far from helpful as a paradigm.”7 Darby Kathleen 
Ray, too, says that “the salvific values of suffering, self-sacrifice, and obedience are too 
easily distorted into a theological tool of subjugation.”8 Marit Trelstad believes these 
themes could encourage a “hero-victim relation, even if it claims to offer protection and 
salvation, there is an inherent disregard of the presumed victim’s self-agency.”9 James 
Cone asserts that the dominating white theology of America “becomes a sedative that 
makes the victims of injustice content with servitude. Without struggle, the negative 
suffering inflicted by oppressors becomes positive and thus leads to passivity and 
submission. Without struggle, the idea of redemption becomes a human creation . . . 
designed to numb the pain” instead of bring about human flourishing.10   
 The charge laid down by all of these thinkers in their own way is if the kenotic 
motif is to survive as a viable theme in Christianity, it must be subjected to a new set of 
criteria and refashioned and clarified in a manner that does not obscure the liberating 
power of the gospel. If some of these more sobering charges are true of kenotic discourse, 
then all who employ kenotic language are encouraging bondage and passivity instead of 
extolling the freedom offered in Christ. The crux of the matter is this: does kenotic 
discourse make disciples or produce victims? 
The Argument 
 
                                                          
7
 Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 155. 
8
 Quoted in Mark A. Mcintosh, Divine Teaching: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 96. 
9
 Marit Trelstad, “Introduction,” in Cross Examinations: Readings on the Meaning of the Cross 
Today, ed. Marit Trelstad (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2006), 7. 
 
10
 James Cone, God of the Oppressed (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 168. 
5 
 
These themes and questions raised thus far should indicate that there are many 
avenues from which to approach this problem of kenosis and human flourishing.  
For example, one could examine kenosis through a survey of changes in the kenotic motif 
throughout history. This was undertaken in the 70’s by Donald Dawe and also more 
recently by David Brown.
11
 Another approach would be to examine only contemporary 
discussions of kenosis. Yet another approach would be to focus on a particular thinker 
that emphasizes kenosis in some way:  P.T. Forsyth, Jürgen Moltmann, Sarah Coakley, 
Oliver Davies, Sergei Bulgakov, and various philosophers would be worthy of such a 
study.  
 This dissertation will approach the problem through the theology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar. While the contemporary problem of human flourishing remains of interest and 
present as an implicit conversation partner; the content of this dissertation will be the 
theme of kenosis as it operates within Balthasar’s writings. I chose Balthasar for this 
study for three main reasons: First, this conversation about kenosis and Balthasar has 
already begun. Aristotle Papanikolaou’s article “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse: Hans Urs 
von Balthasar and Feminist Theologies in Conversation” in Modern Theology began a 
dialogue about Balthasar’s kenosis and what it might mean for a contemporary 
anthropology.
12
 Papanikolaou’s work was also continued in a 2012 article by Carolyn 
Chau entitled, “What Could Possibly Be Given?: Towards an Exploration of Kenosis as 
Forgiveness-Continuing the Conversation Between Coakley, Hampson, and 
                                                          
 
11
 Donald G. Dawe, The Form of a Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963).  David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the Construction of a 
Christian Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2011). 
 
12
 Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis and Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist 
Theologies in Conversation,” Modern Theology 19, no. 1 (2004). 
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Papanikolaou.”13 I see my own work as a participation in these conversations through a 
more extended treatment of Balthasar’s writings.  
 Second, Balthasar is influential in contemporary theology but often 
misunderstood. Many aspects of his theology are polarizing. It is my hope that this 
dissertation can provide some clarity in Balthasar’s theology as well as suggesting that 
theologians in the contemporary situation need not either accept Balthasar’s theology 
wholeheartedly or roundly reject it. In the case of kenosis, I hope to show that his thought 
offers a flexibility that he himself did not make use of in terms of the application of self-
surrender. 
 Third, my own research and interests have centered on Balthasar’s theology for 
quite some time now. I find his theology valuable, challenging, and interesting. When I 
discovered Papanikolaou’s article, I felt that his work and the suggestions he made 
begged for a deeper treatment of Balthasar’s sources than the length of an article would 
allow and that is how this project began.  
While the problem of kenosis in the contemporary context cannot be quickly or 
easily solved, and it is not my intention to do so, I will argue that Balthasar’s use of the 
kenotic motif is intended to preserve and facilitate personal agency and prevent the loss 
of self. I defend that statement in two main parts.
14
 The first part of my argument will 
investigate Balthasar’s criticisms of a variety of worldviews. I will establish that the 
                                                          
 
13
 Carolyn A. Chau, “What Could Possibly Be Given?: Towards an Exploration of Kenosis as 
Forgiveness-Continuing the Conversation Between Coakley, Hampson, and Papanikolaou,” Modern 
Theology 28, no. 1 (2012). 
 
14
 While these are the two main parts of my argument the content of the dissertation will be 
skewed heavily toward the second part because Balthasar’s positive constructions are most worthy of 
inspection. The first part of the argument serves as boundary markers from which to guide us through the 
real important pieces of Balthasar’s thought. 
7 
 
essence of these critical comments point to a unifying concern: to protect the integrity of 
human agency. I will use these criticisms to discover the boundaries of Balthasar’s 
kenotic discourse that will allow me to clarify what Balthasar does not mean when he 
speaks of self-emptying, self-surrender, self-giving and so forth.
15
 I use the term “self-
annihilation” to describe the outer edge of Balthasar’s definition of kenosis and I will 
describe ways in which Balthasar sees self-annihilation occurring.
16
  
Second, I will analyze the positive construction of kenosis within Balthasar’s 
work. He believes that kenotic love is the only way to safeguard the self on an 
ontological as well as spiritual level. This will require both examining kenosis in terms of 
a multilayered approach to relational love that expresses itself in christological and 
Trinitarian language in addition to understanding Balthasar’s description of selfhood and 
spirituality. 
This introductory chapter will concentrate on two related but separate areas. The 
first area will provide an overview of Balthasar’s theological style and in general terms, 
describe the difference between motif, doctrine, and the problematic language 
                                                          
15
 I see this aspect of my dissertation to function in a similar manner to what Kevin Mongrain does 
in his book, Kevin Mongrain, The Sytematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar: An Irenaean Retrieval  
(New York: Herder & Herder, 2002). Mongrain argues for the centrality of an Irenaean vision of 
Christianity to Balthasar, which is the mutual glorification of humanity and God. But at the same time he is 
not attempting to address the accuracy of Balthasar’s reading of Irenaeus as based in the Irenaean texts. My 
argument is similar in that it is not my intention to analyze the strength of Balthasar’s reading of other 
religions or philosophies. It is my intention to describe what Balthasar sees as problematic within them and 
to show how those problems indicate something vital about the boundaries within the kenotic motif 
operates in his work.  
 
16
 It must be acknowledged that “self-annihilation” does not always take on a negative tone for 
Balthasar. It depends on context. However, out of all the terms Balthasar uses to describe the phenomenon 
of kenosis is most clearly on the fringe. “Talk of ‘annihilation’ takes on contrary meanings, depending on 
whether the criterion is the un-word or the super-word. If the absolute is the One that excludes any sort of 
multiplicity and so rules out anything that exists after the manner of worldly being, whether material or 
spiritual, it can be attained or at least touched only through the radical removal of finite being. Such is the 
path of all extrabiblical forms of religious mysticism.”  Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological 
Logical Theory: Volume II: Truth of God, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 
120-121. Hereafter cited as TL II. 
8 
 
surrounding kenosis. Once these preliminaries are established, the second area will 
typologize Balthasar’s criticisms of an array of philosophies, religions, and spiritualities. 
It is my contention, in this second area, that Balthasar’s criticisms of other religions 
center mainly on their understanding of human flourishing and the relation of that 
flourishing to a kenotic model of divine and human activity. 
The Context
 
 
Balthasar was extremely well-read, and his criticisms of other views often appear 
in terse, general statements. He often consolidated all of his expansive reading by 
establishing two extremes and placing his own thought in between. This leaves almost 
any interpreter, no matter how learned, feeling as if Balthasar has done away with entire 
schools of thought with a casual stroke of the pen. 
Take, for example, the organizational structure of Balthasar’s book Love Alone is 
Credible.
17
 Balthasar organizes this book around the ideological constructions of the 
cosmos and the human person. After a one-hundered-and-forty-six-page litany of names, 
thinkers, and eras of history he distills the opposing positions down to two insufficient 
categories. Balthasar offers his solution to these historical insufficiencies, a third category 
of unprecedented kenotic love, as the meaning of the universe, central ethical ideal, and 
highest integrative motif. “The point of integration cannot lie in cosmology. . . . But it is 
also not possible that the point should lie in anthropology, because man is no measure for 
God, and man’s answer is no measure for the Word that is sent to him.”18 This is a 
                                                          
 
17
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 147. 
 
18
 Ibid. 
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powerful polemic approach that can be a barrier to those who wish bring Balthasar’s 
thought into dialogue with others. 
Balthasar’s positive constructions also receive equal puzzlement from some 
interpreters. His close relationship to the mystic, Adrienne von Speyr is often ignored, his 
treatment of the descent into hell has raised questions about his orthodoxy, and his 
unusual approach to the study of the early Fathers have drawn criticism from academic 
specialists in those fields.
19
 But most important, for our purposes, is to grasp the inner 
style and logic that gives rise to both Balthasar’s criticisms of other systems of belief and 
the content of his theology. Balthasar’s approach suffuses his criticisms and his 
constructions with figurative, metaphorical, robust, speculative, and allusive language.  
 This style causes consternation for those who came after Balthasar. On the one 
hand, the scholar can’t help but experience a sense of freedom and exhilaration at this 
affective and heady mixture of ideas expressed with such force and creativity. But on the 
other, his work also tends to leave the reader without the clear and comforting 
demarcations of a more conventional systematic theology.
20
   
                                                          
 
19
 For more on this issue of the descent see Edward T. Oakes, “The Internal Logic of Holy 
Saturday in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 
2 (2007): 184-199. Alyssa Pitstick, “Development of Doctrine, or Denial? Balthasar's Holy Saturday and 
Newman's Essay,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11(2009): 131-145., Gavin D’Costa, “The 
Descent into Hell as a Solution for the Problem of the Fate of Unevangelized non-Christians: Balthasar's 
Hell, the Limbo of the Fathers, and Purgatory,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 2 
(2009): 146-171. Edward T. Oakes, “Descensus and Development: A Response to Recent Rejoinders,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 13, no. 1 (2011): 3-24. For von Speyr see Mongrain, The 
Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 10-12.  For the Fathers, see Polycarp Sherwood, “Survey 
of Recent Work on St. Maximus the Confessor,” Traditio 20(1964): 428-437.  
 
20
 R.R. Reno addressed this aspect of Balthasar’s style in a negative way, almost to the point of 
suggesting that Balthasar did Catholicism a disservice. See R.R. Reno, “Theology After the Revolution,” 
First Things (May 2007). While Reno’s point agrees with my exploration of Balthasar’s boundaries, I have 
some reservations of Reno’s proposal for a more systematic style of presentation. For a more positive 
review of Balthasar’s style, see Angelo Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Theological Style (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1995).  
10 
 
Yet it is not mere rhetorical flourish: this “style” does not just dance across the 
surface of the Balthasarian waters. It is equally evident in the organization he employs 
(contrary to the usual systematic expression in terms of theological loci) and in the 
sources he draws from.
21
 Balthasar remains a much more staunchly anti-systematic 
thinker than those who take the Neo-Scholastic approach. Balthasar, in reflecting on his 
own work, described his approach to theology as moving along the path of Goethe while 
theologians like Rahner, choose the path of Kant.
22
 To put the difference rather crudely, 
Balthasar, in following Goethe tends to view reality from an aesthetic and 
phenomenological perspective, rather than choosing a Kantian instrumentality of 
practical reason.  
While Balthasar may lack the typical conceptual overlay that does not mean there 
is no coherence or organization, and some scholars have argued persuasively that there is 
an internal logic to help assuage the confusion. This study, on the kenotic motif, will 
build on this scholarship that envisions an internal logic within Balthasar’s theology.23 
Yet, before attending to this internal logic, I would like to move from the difficulty of 
Balthasar’s style to the problem of kenosis itself. Kenotic language, which is already 
inherently paradoxical, becomes even more complicated when expressed in Balthasar’s 
                                                          
 
21
 If Balthasar’s theological sources point us toward a different theological style, Aidan Nichols 
makes the important point that “playwrights, poets and novelists as theological sources [are] as important 
as the fathers or the schoolmen.”Aidan Nichols, “Introduction,” in Mysterium Paschale (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2000), 1. 
 
22
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Geist und Feuer: Ein Gespräch mit Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Herder 
Korrespondenz 30(1976): 72-82. Quoted in Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 1994), 72-73. Oakes goes into fascinating detail about the 
differences of these two approaches. 
 
23
 Kevin Mongrain does something similar in his book that he calls the “Doxological Rule of 
Resistance,” which is a set of internal criteria that he believes assist in helping scholars understand the 
Balthasar’s theology. Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 201-206. 
11 
 
style. The next section will address how the motif of kenosis functions in this 
dissertation. 
It is important to explore briefly what motifs are and how they differ from 
doctrine. Doctrine is usually divided up into topics such as the Christian life, the nature of 
God, salvation, and the person and work of Jesus. These are presented as discrete yet 
connected topics and are often expressed in the form of propositions. The idea of motif, 
as described by Dawe and Anders Nygren, is a “broad assertion” at the core of 
something.
24
  
Kenosis is a motif that speaks to the core of Christianity and reoccurs in many 
different contexts. The “broad assertion” is that God’s relationship to sinners is 
characterized by his infinite and continual self-gift. It is infinite because God’s resources 
are, of course, unlimited. This self-gift reoccurs in various biblical stories. It recurs in 
theological extrapolations, as well as spiritual treatises and hymns. It forms the central 
piece of the Eucharist and other liturgical practices. It informs our ethics and our 
decisions about what a good life might look like.  
In choosing the path of Goethe, Balthasar allows for a freedom in expression of 
the kenotic motif that many other theologians are either unwilling to or incapable of 
executing. Balthasar is less concerned with presenting an orderly and sequential 
presentation of Christian theology than allowing the essential core of the Christian faith 
to be illustrated and revealed in a myriad of ways. His approach is more 
phenomenological. 
                                                          
 
24
 Dawe, The Form of a Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif, 19. 
12 
 
 The second inference that justifies my approach is that the relation that Dawe 
sees between motif and doctrine follows the organization of this dissertation. I will be 
examining how kenosis changes depending on the doctrinal context and how the themes 
of kenosis impact those doctrines. This will provide at least some order to the kenotic 
motif, which is sorely needed if we are to avoid using it in a manner that contradicts the 
human flourishing that is contained in the offer of salvation as truly good news. Yet as a 
motif, kenosis is used in a variety of doctrines and in spiritual writings and it appears 
under the guise of terms such as abandonment, indifference, self-surrender, self-sacrifice, 
self-giving, agape, and others. The definition is simply “emptying,” yet its meaning has a 
power that underlies liturgy, ethics, anthropology, spirituality, and theology. This is why 
I am using the term kenosis not only in reference to the original Greek terminology and 
its biblical reference but also using it to represent this motif in more general terms. I 
chose to use the term kenosis to describe this entire phenomenon because of its biblical 
origins and its connection to the doctrine of the Incarnation. For Balthasar, the 
Incarnation is the central piece of revelation and it is the only basis for the kenotic motif. 
The Fruit of Original Sin: Absorption and Autonomy 
One way to think about Balthasar’s theological commitments is to begin with 
what he sees as the central problem, i.e., how Balthasar talks about original sin. In 
humanity’s original state, 
the deepest longing of man is to ascend to God, to become like God indeed to 
 become equal to God. . . . But we know that the serpent got a hold of this very 
 innermost drive of man [toward God and transcendence] to press on to God, and 
 poisoned it. Original sin does not sit somewhere on the periphery of human 
13 
 
 nature; no, the very promise eritis sicut dei [you shall be like gods] is the 
 perversion of the original core of man’s being itself.25  
 
In his concept of original sin, a natural and good desire–to be like God–becomes 
perverted so that humanity no longer seeks this transcendence in cooperation with God’s 
intention, but “gives his notice to God that he will no longer do God’s service.”26 
Balthasar’s theology is characterized–and his reading of intellectual and spiritual history 
informed–by this understanding of original sin as a human initiative to engage with God 
in a manner that God has not decreed. Every single religion, philosopher, and spiritual 
path in existence bears within it this problem. 
Apart from God, this leaves humanity with two choices, according to Balthasar. 
The history of spirituality, philosophy, and religion can’t escape the “despairing dialectic 
between the identification of itself with God and the denial of God, only to arrive in the 
end, at a chaotic failure to distinguish between the two.”27 I term these two approaches 
absorption and autonomy. In Balthasar’s understanding, both of these approaches arise 
from faulty uses of the kenotic motif and lead to what I term self-annihilation.” 
 Balthsasar’s problem with philosophies of absorption is that they deny the agency 
of the individual, rendering him or her passive and incapable of achieving a dynamic 
relationship with the divine. This category of absorption applies to those who view 
spirituality as a necessary escape from creaturely limitation. Creaturely life is considered 
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a “burden” to be overcome by losing one’s self in the Absolute Spirit.28 The spiritual 
practice that follows out of this approach is devastating to the self: 
Thus one finds in one’s human nature a place-perhaps only a point, but this point 
suffices-where one can, as it were, traffic with God ‘religiously’ on the same 
footing, where a mystical identity obtains between Creator and creature. Now to 
reach this mysterious identity-point requires all kinds of strenuous effort: The 
earthly atemporal now seem in this regard to be only an external husk that 
envelopes and hides the inner kernel which must be shattered ascetically, 
‘denied,’ and made transparent. The perfected and knowing exercitant looks 
through all this as mere appearance, for all non-identity with the divine is 
basically a non-being; and this applies as well therefore to the constricted ego and 
to one’s unique individuality.29 
 
 In other words, kenosis in the absorption model focuses on the removal of the earthly, 
the body, the creature, viewing it as an obstacle for the divine spark of humanity’s 
unification with divine fullness. 
  Take for example, the practice of nonviolence in the Eastern religions. This 
example of classic absorption spirituality is undergirded by the metaphysical belief that 
separation, including the existence of individual experience, is an illusion. Therefore, 
Balthasar avers, these spiritual paths “since the Upanishads–in Buddhism, Jainism, 
Vishnuism . . . aim to destroy the appearance of personality.”30 To Balthasar, this 
nonviolent approach is fundamentally misguided because the agency of the individual is 
already obliterated because there is no such thing as an individual. Nonviolence is 
embraced upon the prior assumption that individual physical suffering is an illusion. 
 Balthasar also decries a modern interpretation of absorption, which it is less about 
the surrender of individuality to become one with an Absolute divine being and more 
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about the individual’s surrender to an ideal or societal goal–even one that is thoroughly 
materialistic and atheistic in nature. Balthasar believes the philosophies of Marx and 
Hegel are dangerous for that reason. Kevin Mongrain remarks,    
von Balthasar demonstrates that Hegel believes that the particular individual must 
make an act of absolute surrender to the “generalized individual” of the nation or 
the state. This act of surrender requires the overcoming of the point of view of 
insane self-conceit, which undertakes to improve the world according to the ‘law 
of one’s own undisciplined heart’ . . . ; the overcoming of the point of view of 
private virtue, which is ‘conquered by the world’s onward course.’ Von Balthasar 
goes on to explain-directly quoting Hegel's highly pejorative terminology that this 
overcoming of self in surrender to the state requires also that one surrender all 
personal care for anything that one could call one’s own, the desire to be 
recognized by others, and the “hypocrisy” that one’s “conscience” is absolute. 
Thus for Hegel, on von Balthasar's interpretation, reconciling the finite particular 
and the infinite universal requires the complete relinquishing of personal 
existence in a total surrender to assimilation by the “absolute spirit” as it is 
expressed in the “community of the nation” in its political organization by the 
state; this total surrender finds its highest expression in the individual's 
willingness to undergo death as a sign of solidarity with the nation.
31
  
 
Whether it is the stages of purification, purgation, and illumination of the Eastern 
Religions or the totalitarian vision of Hegel and Marx, Balthasar subjects them to the 
same criticisms: in varying degrees they take the practice of kenotic love out of its proper 
context and thus destroy its power to transform the individual. In particular there are two 
main faults that merit further exploration: it glorifies suffering, and promotes a passive 
spirituality.  
 Suffering is absolutely not an intrinsic good in Balthasar’s understanding and 
should, therefore, not be glorified. It remains an inevitable experience for the Christian on 
the spiritual journey but Balthasar does not consider it to have inherent value. What 
matters is the disposition of the Christian who faces suffering.  
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It is not a question of glorifying earthly suffering (often the result of worldly 
injustice) [Mt. 5:6], persecution [5:10] and abuse [5:11], which could be morally 
doubtful) but of whether we are open or closed to the fundamental values of the 
kingdom of God. Such openness can prove itself through action, even through 
militancy, just as much as through endurance.
32
  
 
Not only does Balthasar condemn the glorification of suffering but resistance to suffering 
is an inference from this passage. Even in the life of a saint, where the extremes of love 
reach heightened proportions, Balthasar places a cautionary word about using suffering as 
a spiritual tool of growth. “The point isn’t the record of suffering but the intensity of love. 
Every penance that increases true love is good; any penance that narrows and preoccupies 
the soul is harmful.”33 This statement shows a considerable concern for the individual as 
they discern their own call in the midst of the kingdom.  
 For some, their callings may well involve suffering–that is not to be debated. But 
suffering is neither an end in itself nor something that should be always avoided. There is 
a level of discernment that is necessary. Suffering must be chosen only when love is 
present and the will of God is clear. It is when “the attitude of renunciation hardens to a 
defence against pain and death–and thus also against love–it becomes self-deception.”34  
 This is precisely what Balthasar sees happening in the absorption typology. 
“Buddhists and Stoics train themselves to enter a sphere without suffering and hate; the 
impact of contradictions does not affect them, for they communicate with the enemy in a 
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supra-personal absolute. The Christian, however, must open his heart and allow himself 
to be the most intimately affected, challenged, hurt.”35   
  Balthasar also condemns absorption philosophies because they promote passive 
spiritualities, in which the importance of human activity goes unacknowledged. Balthasar 
interprets the kenotic motif in terms of an active obedience: “This co-operation can no 
longer remain at the level of indifference in the sense of merely letting things happen; no, 
the particular will of God, which is to be actively grasped and carried out, must also be 
actively pursued. For the Rhineland mystics, abandonment came in at the end.”36 In this 
quotation Balthasar shows a legitimate concern on the placement of the abandonment. 
What he means is that by placing abandonment at the end, two consequences result. The 
beginning of the spiritual journey harbors an undercurrent of autonomy and technique. 
Second, abandonment at the end without any connection to the active process of 
spirituality results in a passive eternal rest. Both of these consequences are highly 
problematic for Balthasar as I will show later. 
 Absorption’s equally damaging opposite is what I will call autonomy: the belief 
that human agency is solely realized in individual action and rational choice.
37
 The 
individual is seen as the arbiter of meaning. What is so distasteful to Balthasar about this 
perspective is that it places the emphasis on human activity to the exclusion of divine 
revelation and promotes violence and competition among humanity. 
  The term ‘autonomy’ can also be misleading. In Theo-Drama II, Balthasar 
stridently declares that human freedom (he calls it “finite” freedom) is “a presupposition 
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for the whole biblical drama . . . that takes place between God and mankind.”38 What 
Balthasar cautions against is a human autonomy that rejects the path of self-giving love in 
exchange for self-realization: “Thus a man may decide that, for the purposes of self-
realization, the whole area must remain completely open (so that, if there were a 
preexistent and fully realized absolute freedom, the path of finite freedom would only be 
distorted and its course frustrated)” (italics mine).39 Because of what we know of 
Balthasar’s internal logic and his remedy for original sin, it may not come as a surprise to 
see that he believes the ultimate result of the autonomy model of self-actualization is 
rejection of God’s invitation, it is a “No” to God, which inevitably ends in self-
annihilation. “Man responds to this provocation [in the post-Christian situation] by 
attempting to manufacture the kingdom of God on earth, with increasing means and 
methods of power; logically this power that resists the powerlessness of the Cross is 
bound to destroy itself, for it bears the principle of self-annihilation within it by saying 
No to the claim of Christ.”40 The power and autonomy offered by post-Christian sources 
lead not to self-fulfillment but to destruction. 
 In Balthasar’s reading of history, there are many ups and downs in Christian 
theology. Scholasticism and the modern period have brought about a refreshing and 
important emphasis on the importance of individuality and the “meaning and 
consciousness of Christian mission.”41 The uniqueness of each person comes to the fore. 
Yet, there is a danger that this might morph into a more radical approach where the 
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individual is given sole authority and free reign. There is a sliding scale in Balthasar’s 
estimation on the autonomy principle and various thinker’s relation to it.42   
 Take, for example, Balthasar’s infamous criticisms of Karl Rahner. Balthasar and 
Rahner have many commonalities, and Balthasar showed appreciation for some aspects 
of Rahner’s work, but ultimately he worried that Rahner’s Christian convictions are 
overshadowed by his ideas from German Idealism. Fergus Kerr explains:   
It is always a good question to ask what a philosopher fears. Von Balthasar’s 
highly implausible claim that the success of Christianity has wiped out all other 
forms of religion and metaphysics is tied up with his suspicions of Karl Rahner’s 
theology.” He fears that the deity of natural religion is “the kind of God whom 
now, in the post-Christian age, modern transcendental theology would like to 
reinstate.”43  
 
Balthasar equates German idealism with the newest version of a natural religion.
44
 Karen 
Kilby observes that it is precisely this point at which Balthasar gives his “fiercest 
criticisms of Rahner” and points to the clear implications for the kenotic motif:   
The context of these criticisms, that is to say, is the larger discussion of Christian 
witness (martyrdom), on the one hand, versus ‘the System’ (the system of German 
Idealism), on the other. Christians who want to be modern, to adapt to the times, 
to be able to speak to their fellow human beings in a language that can be 
understood, will be tempted to adopt the System in some form; but the cost, 
Balthasar maintains, will be the loss of martyrdom, of genuine witness, of genuine 
Christianity.
45
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So what Kerr calls Balthasar’s “fear” and what Kilby calls “his fiercest criticism” is the 
encroachment of a natural religious system that displaces kenosis (martyrdom) from the 
central meaning of the Christian faith. This supports the argument of this dissertation in 
the following ways. First, it confirms that Balthasar values the motif of kenosis (here 
expressed in terms of the disciples emulation of Jesus’s emptying in his death). Second it 
reiterates the negative role that autonomy plays in the system of natural pathways to God 
(here expressed through his concerns about German idealism and Rahner’s approach). 
And finally, it reinforces the point made about Balthasar’s concern for system, because 
systems of thought are always designed and initiated by humanity in order to 
comprehend. Balthasar’s goal is not comprehension but the expression of the form of 
Christ and the resultant worship. 
  Many critics of the kenotic motif see freedom, like bread and water and shelter, 
as limited resources, and self-realization as, on some level a Darwinian competition for 
survival in which individuals are pitted against each other to grasp at what is needed for 
freedom and flourishing. From their perspective, other human forces or divine forces are 
obstacles to the individual’s self-realization. And in this worldview, the definitions of 
freedom and agency are reduced to force, power, and strength.
46
 For Balthasar “this 
means that every positive, loving relationship to one’s fellow man, who represents an 
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attack on my freedom, is fundamentally and finally destroyed. Freedom and betrayal go 
together.”47  What starts out as a laudable attempt to preserve individuality and freedom 
ends up destroying the very thing it sought to protect. “Whenever the self tries to prescind 
from its rootedness in God and establish its own autonomy, it is attempting to consolidate 
its freedom; it is attempting to seize power.
48
  
 Balthasar believes that when the desire is divorced from the good and clothed in 
“a hegemony of instrumental rationality” it becomes one of the most audacious and 
honest expressions of evil, and, following Heidegger, he sees nothing surprising of the 
progression from Descartes and Kant’s epistemology to the “absolute will to power in 
Nietzsche.”49 And this will to power and the evil behind it is not merely rhetorical or 
ideological violence but literal violence: 
Within the confines of the world, the desiderium visionis cannot be satisfied 
hence, if it does not seek its peace in God, it gives rise to all the familiar forms of 
fanaticism and anarchism, and the terrorism . . . the classical-romantic Faust 
figures are followed by the political Fausts of our century: thus as a clear 
realization that man, as constituted, can provide no hope of ultimate satisfaction, 
we have Nietzche’s Superman. And everywhere, beside Faust, beside Hegel, 
Marx, Lenin, Stalin, beside Zarathustra and Hitler, we discern the shadow of a 
demon, insinuating that all that exists ‘deserves to be destroyed.’50 
  
The autonomy principle must embrace coercion and violence to achieve its ends. The 
good of human flourishing cannot come out of such a view of the world. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, absorption and autonomy share a common cause: original sin. Yet, 
there are some main differences, especially in relation to kenosis as a practice. The 
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absorption approach is a choice to rebel against creaturely difference by abolishing the 
creature through various sacrificial and ascetic practices. The autonomy approach allows 
the self (at least the rational piece) to come into its own but the relationship to the divine 
is downplayed or used as a justification for competition and oppression of freedom. The 
absorption model distorts the kenosis motif; the autonomy model attempts to obliterate it. 
For Balthasar, engagement with kenosis must take neither of these approaches. Loving 
relations with others and openness to the Divine are fundamental aspects of kenotic 
practice that are denied by the autonomy approach’s sole focus on the self. 
 Yet, merely acknowledging the kenotic nature of reality and exercising it in 
spirituality cannot be the answer either. It cannot be a spiritual technique in which the 
finitude of the person is transcended or considered unimportant. It cannot be an ethical 
principle devoid of relational categories that is forced upon the individual to shape their 
actions. It cannot be an ontological principle in which the “I” of the human person is 
either passively relinquished into the Abyss of the Absolute or a process of knowledge 
that leads to the realization that the “I” is an illusion in the first place. The remaining 
chapters will examine how Balthasar’s theology is an attempt to create a metaphysical 
and spiritual framework, grounded in the kenosis motif that supports a vision of human 
agency that respects creaturehood and offers freedom while situating the self within a 
web of relationships. This definition will move beyond concepts of superficial self-
realization or an abstract ethical ideal, “for neither fantasy nor concept can express the 
true object of man’s real longing. Nor can he know this of himself; for only God can 
23 
 
reveal it to him.”51 God, not human agency, will be the focus of the first two chapters. It 
is fundamental to Balthasar that the nature of humanity finds meaning not only from 
natural sciences, psychology, and philosophy, but from the revealed character of God in 
the Scriptures and in the Church. This is why it will be absolutely crucial to establish the 
character of God and his intentions with his creatures from the very beginning. 
 The second chapter will examine the Incarnation. The third chapter will relate the 
kenotic theme to the trinitarian life. The fourth chapter will discuss the anthropology/ 
spirituality that develop out of Balthasar’s reading of the Trinity and the Incarnation. 
Chapter Five will briefly recapitulate my argument and conclude with an assessment of 
Balthasar’s work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
KENOSIS, INCARNATION AND SALVATION 
 The introductory chapter described the parameters of kenosis in Balthasar’s 
theology by examining his criticisms of various worldviews. He rejects all of these 
worldviews because they do not take into account the kenotic reality of the divine-human 
relationship. Original sin ruptured the kenotic activity between God and humanity so that 
before Christ, even the most sincere and well-intentioned religious systems were doomed 
to fail:  
It was essential that Christ, in his Incarnation, should bring the fullness of heaven 
to earth . . . . Otherwise the contemplation of God would only have been possible 
in the forms of negative apophatic mysticism, which seeks to encounter God 
beyond all that is of the world, as the Wholly Other, who can be neither 
conceived, nor beheld, nor comprehended. Such a view, inevitably, does a great 
injustice to the world and our fellow creatures.
52
  
 
 
Because of original sin, the true self is obscured, marred, and damaged. The Incarnation 
and the ensuing process of salvation and spirituality begin transformation and recovery of 
the true self, and thus, an avenue for attaining unprecedented transformative agency.  
 Yet it is not only other worldviews, but also Christian theology that is deficient. 
Theologians have failed to recognize and articulate the transformative relation between 
the creature and God that is of primary importance to Balthasar. His solution to some of 
these past theological failings is his Theo-drama. As Aiden Nichols remarks: 
What all this means for Balthasar is that we must recognise the priority of theo-
drama over theology. Unless theo-drama is accorded primacy, the varieties of 
contemporary theology Balthasar analysed in his Prolegomena simply cannot find 
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that central point of convergence which they need. The centre is not to be defined 
conceptually, however, as in a theological super-system where the different 
competing systematic theologies might be integrated at the level of ideas.
53
 
 
This is a fundamental shift from a theology of ideas to a theology of relationships. One of 
the first things to note about Balthasar’s discussion of the Incarnation is that it is not 
solely a matter of discovering the historical Jesus. Balthasar starts his inquiry with the 
sense that Jesus is not strictly a historical person, spoken about in the past tense and 
accessible only through written historical accounts. Instead Jesus is alive and active 
within the Church and the scriptures. He avoids treating Jesus (and scripture for that 
matter) as a “quest” in which the truth of Jesus is found through historical-critical 
methods. For Balthasar it would be more appropriate to say that the Christian’s quest 
starts after we encounter Jesus through divine initiative. 
 In this theo-dramatic framework the rational, abstract constructs of philosophy or 
the portraits of Jesus hobbled together from historical sources can never aptly express the 
depth of the drama in the Incarnation. Only drama can adequately frame the Christian 
view of the divine and the human relationship:  “now we must allow the encountering 
reality to speak in its own tongue or, rather, let ourselves be drawn into its dramatic 
arena. For God’s revelation is not an object to be looked at; it is his action in and upon 
the world, and the world can only respond, and hence ‘understand, through action on its 
part.”54  It is crucial to remember that for Balthasar, theology is participatory and active 
because the Incarnation and salvation of humanity is a saving action.  
                                                          
 
53
 Aidan Nichols, No Bloodless Myth: A Guide Through Balthasar's Dramatics (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 52-53. 
 
54
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory I: Prolegomena, trans. 
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 15. Hereafter cited as TD 1. 
26 
 
 Balthasar’s theology follows the contours of this theo-dramatic relationship. 
Prima facie, Trinitarian reflection (and its cosmic implications) seems to offer the most 
comprehensive vantage point from which to examine themes of kenosis. However, 
human knowledge of the Trinitarian matrix is only established a posteriori from the event 
of the Incarnation. The action of God in the Incarnation, not a speculation on the Trinity, 
is the starting point for Balthasar’s enterprise. His answer to the discordant features of 
human attempts at transcendence is to emphasize God’s initiative in the Incarnation 
rather than start with the implications for ontology of a triune God. I will follow 
Balthasar’s own viewpoint that we only know of the triune God through the Incarnation 
of the Son. In addition, Balthasar insists that Christ is also the litmus test for an authentic 
humanity. Jesus is not simply an ideal life into which human beings must wedge 
themselves into a one-size-fits-all christological pattern. Jesus provides a vision of 
humanity “that is worthwhile, in which we need not essentially renounce any genuinely 
human function.”55 Paradoxically, in the Incarnation, for the first time the “true God” 
simultaneously “reveals to us the image of true man.”56  
 
 This chapter will first situate Balthasar’s unique approach to the Incarnation by a 
brief discussion of the often used terms “high and low Christology,” as well as examining 
two proposed narratives of the history of kenosis. Second, I will discuss how Balthasar’s 
theo-dramatic approach creates an especially fruitful conceptual garden for the motif of 
kenosis to blossom. Third, I will describe Balthasar’s conception of the motive within 
                                                          
 
55
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Asceticism,” Communio 27, no. 1 (2000): 25-26. 
 
56
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics: Volume I: Seeing the 
Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 562. In other words, this 
chapter will provide the basis for the further explorations into trinitarian kenotic activity and in tracing 
human kenotic activity in the next chapters. Hereafter cited as GL 1. 
27 
 
God, for the Incarnation. Fourth, I will explore Balthasar’s vision of the salvific action of 
Jesus involving five biblical metaphors. Within these metaphors, I will highlight their 
relation to kenosis as well as other features of Balthasar’s Christology. 
Balthasar’s Approach to the Incarnation and the History of Kenosis 
 I would like to elaborate now on how Balthasar’s Christology might set him apart 
from other Christian thinkers. It has become a pedagogical trope to describe christologies 
as either “high” or “low” or “from above” and “from below.”  While the use of these 
terms can be vague, I will use Oliver Crisp’s recent work to lend some clarity to where 
Balthasar might fall in this spectrum.
57
 First, it is important to note that, for Crisp, a high 
Christology is not completely synonymous with a Christology from above, nor a low 
Christology the same thing as a Christology from below. The high/low dichotomy refers 
to the scale of the divine and human element of Jesus while the “above” and “below” 
terms are related to methodological approaches to Christology. And, for Crisp, none of 
these categories can be claimed as completely orthodox. According to Crisp, a high 
Christology is defined as one “according to which Christ is (minimally) more than 
human”58 and a low Christology as one in “which Christ is (minimally) fully and merely 
human.”59  This definition of high Christology is not necessarily and indicator of 
orthodoxy. In fact, Crisp points out that some heresies, such as Arianism and Docetism fit 
within this definition.
60
  In definition a “low” Christology can either affirm the fullness of 
the human person of Jesus Christ (as any orthodox position would hold) or can extend 
their definition to mean that Jesus was merely human and nothing else.  
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 The other two categories used to classify christological approaches are 
Christology from above and from below. These indicate an emphasis on how one views 
the source materials. A Christology from above “begins with the data of divine revelation 
contained in, or generated by Scripture and/or the propositions of Catholic creeds and 
confessional statements and uses these data to formulation Christological statements.”61 
The christological approach “from below” is “any method in Christology that beings with 
the data of historical document that refer to Christ including the new Testament and other 
extra-biblical materials, and uses these data to formulate christological statements.”62 
 So, how much to these definitions help further this christological conversation?  
And furthermore, how do they aid in expressing Balthasar’s own positions?  In brief, 
Balthasar utilizes a combination of these approaches and does add one element. Balthasar 
definitely has a strong sense that Jesus is the divine Son, and thus holds to a high 
Christology. Yet, when it comes to methodological considerations, Balthasar is more 
complex. He does insist on the priority of divine revelation and is a faithful adherent to 
the creeds. He is suspicious of the approach from below, viewing it as a nascent attempt 
to fashion a Christology from a set of materialistic suppositions. However, Balthasar 
himself employs a Christology from below approach in Theo-Drama and recognizes its 
value.
63
  
 One additional aspect of Balthasar’s theology that Crisp’s book doesn’t seem to 
account for is the experience and texts of the saints. For Balthasar, phenomena in these 
lives are christologically revelatory. In some ways this approach could be called “from 
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above” in that these lives are judged by the creeds, church, and revelation. But in another 
way, these are human lives and writings, existing in historical context and they have often 
been marginalized doctrinally, even by the church itself. This aspect of Balthasar’s 
theology will be taken up in Chapter Four. 
 Balthasar holds the truths of the high and low christologies together in a unique 
way that Mark McIntosh has brought attention to in his aptly titled book, Christology 
Within. Instead of approaching Christology solely from above or below, McIntosh argues 
that Balthasar searches out the connection between a Chalcedonian doctrine and the 
“spirit” of the Ignatian model of mystical encounter,64 in an attempt to avoid some of the 
“metaphysical discomfort” of the high Christology approach.65 McIntosh notes that 
metaphysical discomfort is mitigated by emphasizing Jesus’s actions as the connection 
point between the divine and human in Jesus. The activities of Jesus have usually been 
the domain of christologies of the low sort, in which they are discussed as human actions 
designed to teach or enlighten. However, since Balthasar sees in the activity of Jesus a 
union in mission with the divine, he sees it more than merely a moralizing lesson and at 
the same time, Balthasar also refuses to accept any high Christology that would threaten 
the understanding that Jesus’s actions are anything other than perfectly human.66 This is a 
key piece that is noted by McIntosh: 
Where Chalcedon speaks of a union of divine and human essences in Christ, von 
Balthasar will speak of union of divine and human activity in Christ. He does this 
by radicalizing a suggestion that Maximus the Confessor had drawn from 
trinitarian theology and applied to christology. Maximus speaks of how the 
eternal Son possesses the divine essence according to his particular mode of 
existence as the Son. So Christ’s humanity, while remaining perfectly human in 
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its essence, is lived out according to that particular pattern of life or mode of 
existence which is the perfect enactment in human terms of the Son’s eternal 
mode of existence. Von Balthasar adopts this christological insight 
wholeheartedly, for it allows him to speak of the divine in Christ precisely in 
terms of the very human pattern and activity of Jesus’ life. This becomes almost 
an organic impulse in von Balthasar’s christology.67   
 
This “organic impulse” is important because it cultivates a uniquely fertile moment for 
kenosis in the history of Christian thought. The kenosis motif is allowed to operate in 
other theological areas usually closed off to its influence. To more fully understand this 
fertile moment, I will now discuss the narrative of kenosis that is offered. 
 Discussions of kenosis in theology almost always fall exclusively under the rubric 
of Christology. It seems prudent then, in order to support my claim that Balthasar’s 
theology offers a more comprehensive and unique view of kenosis to elaborate on that 
history within the christological context of this chapter.
68
 To begin with kenosis is to 
begin with Philippians 2:4-11 (ESV version):   
Let each of you look not only to his own interests, but also to the interests of 
others.
5 
 Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in Christ Jesus,
6 
 who, 
though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be 
grasped,
7 
but emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant,
 
being born in the 
likeness of men.
8 
And being found in human form, he humbled himself by 
becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.
9 
 Therefore God 
has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name that is above every 
name,
10 
so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on 
earth and under the earth,
11 
and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to 
the glory of God the Father. 
This passage is one of the rare places that the word kenosis actually appears in Scripture. 
It has spawned numerous interpretations running the gamut from a decisive change in 
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God’s being to an ethical and hymnic metaphor for God’s action.69 Yet as David Brown 
argues, the importance of this passage can be overblown. A full understanding of kenosis 
“must stand or fall on the best interpretation of the New Testament as a whole . . .”70 
 The theologians of the patristic era debated some significant and substantive 
parameters around the doctrine of the Incarnation. Due to cultural context, the newness of 
the faith, and political influences, one of the central concerns was to describe how Jesus 
became both God and man. While these debates happened with reference to metaphysical 
concepts, the underlying concern was always soteriological. What did it mean for 
humanity if Jesus was the highest, first-born creature rather than God’s very Son? 
 According to most interpreters of the history of kenosis, the early church was 
focused on creating a creed that prevented specific interpretations of Arian views and this 
prevented them from detaching themselves from the corrupting influence of Hellenistic 
philosophy. These views represented a perceived threat to the divinity of Jesus. In 
addition to the Arian family of theological perspectives, the influence of Gnostic beliefs 
“ascribed to the Logos only an apparent body (which excluded a Kenosis)” which also 
caused difficulties for the early church as it set out to elaborate its beliefs.
71
  So while the 
Fathers were able to affirm a real descent and a real humiliation in the Incarnation, David 
Brown reiterates that they were “closed off by the taking up of anti-heretical position, 
whether in defence of the unchangedness of the form of God, and so of the Son’s glory 
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even during his Kenosis, or of the unchangeability of God in general.”72 And Donald 
Dawe believes that the Arian controversies so controlled the interpretation of Philippians 
2 that it skewed that interpretation away from acknowledging a possible change in God.
73
 
 According to the narrative provided by these authors, the idea of kenosis could 
gain little traction in this period because of this doctrine of immutability. But that 
narrative is skewed. Balthasar’s disagreement with the narratives of kenosis that Dawe 
and Brown provide is that they are operating within the unfortunate paradigm of Adolf 
Harnack: they reject all versions of immutability as mutually exclusive with the kenotic 
motif, ignoring the connection between the biblical version of apatheia and its 
connection to kenotic Christology. 
 Both authors assume that kenosis by definition is tied to an emptying in some 
capacity of divine attributes and thus excludes the possibility of divine immutability.
74
   
What does this mean for Balthasar? Balthasar is no blind adopter of patristic or medieval 
thought and he diverges from it in many ways,
75
 but as Edward Oakes remarks, Balthasar 
perceived the “essentially biblical presuppositions that operate within all of the Church 
Fathers, transforming—however unconsciously, in many cases—the philosophy they 
inherited.”76 Essentially, Balthasar believed that the biblical center of the mystical 
tradition was present in antiquity in a way that Harnack and his followers were unable to 
accept: 
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The technique of apatheia in antiquity for self-salvation from the world 
becomes, in the Christian age, the ascetic expansion of the heart and its 
preparation in order that it should flow into an unlimited readiness to love. 
. . . From Augustine via Benedict to Francis and Ignatius, this remains the 
primal truth which, though unchanging in its essence, is constantly 
illumined in new ways.
77
 
 
 These authors have generally appropriated Harnack’s thesis that rampant 
Hellenism caused a homogenous doctrinal formulation of God’s immutability that was 
taken not from biblical revelation but from Greek philosophy. As Lewis Ayres has argued 
regarding the fourth century, the problem is that the message scholars receive is that the 
historical-critical method is the sophisticated way of reading scripture and that the 
patristic method is the naive way of reading scripture. When this presupposition coupled 
with the general dismay fostered by Harnack’s influence at the perceived philosophical 
and ascetic corruptions of the gospel holds sway, it fosters a superficial engagement not 
only with patristic writers but medieval ones as well that leads to misinterpretations of 
these writers’ theologies. 
 Once Dawe’s and Brown’s narratives move out of the patristic era, they focus 
most of their energies on the creative developments that occurred in the nineteenth 
century in German and English circles, which were characterized by the willingness to 
dispense with notions of immutability. However, the problem with these later 
developments in kenotic thought, according to Balthasar, is that early Lutheran 
theologians were hampered by a viewing of the “divine attributes in an Old Testament 
fashion.”78   
 The previous discussions of high and low Christology and the account of the 
history of kenosis offer a sort of beginning or prolegomena for Balthasar’s doctrine of the 
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Incarnation and kenosis. They are both attempts at differentiating Balthasar’s approach 
conceptually and historically in order to make the case that, for Balthasar, the Incarnation 
is of the utmost importance. Indeed it is the singular happening in all of reality that 
impacts all other facets of life and living. Balthasar’s fascinating linkage of the 
Incarnation with kenosis and the implications he draws from it is expressed with 
wonderful creativity and courage.  
  Since the Incarnation is a response to sin and evil, Jesus Christ is predominantly a 
savior. Balthasar’s description of Christology includes the work that Jesus does to secure 
our salvation. If it is true that salvation is the goal of the Incarnation, for Balthasar, then it 
can also be said that the kenosis is the primary descriptor of the Incarnation. As Aidan 
Nichols notes, that for Balthasar it is “the kenosis of divine love, not the aussumptio of 
the human nature, is the primary message of the Incarnation.”79 This section will describe 
in more general terms what the doctrine of the Incarnation means for Balthasar and how 
that doctrine uses kenosis in relation to various aspects of the drama of salvation using 
five biblical motifs. 
The Five Biblical Motifs of Salvation 
 Balthasar covers five biblical motifs, or key features of salvation in the fourth 
volume of the Theo-Drama. While he believes these five motifs cannot be assimilated 
into a closed system, it will become evident through this exposition that they all contain 
the element of kenosis. Balthasar’s vision of salvation is affected through stages of 
kenotic activity and that human agency is one of the outcomes of this kenotic activity. 
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Balthasar believes the “quintessence of Scripture” can be encapsulated in the following 
five motifs: 
(1) The Son gives himself, through God the Father, for the world’s salvation. (2) 
The Sinless One “changes places” with sinners. While, in principle, the Church 
Fathers understand this in a radical sense, it is only in the modern variation of the 
theories of representation that the consequences are fully drawn out. (3) Man is 
thus set free (ransomed, redeemed, released). (4) More than this, however, he is 
initiated into the divine life of the Trinity. (5) Consequently, the whole process is 
shown to be the result of an initiative on the part of divine love.
80
 
 
This section will expound on these motifs, noting how each one relates to the person of 
Jesus and the motif of kenosis.  
 The first motif contemplates the Son’s self-gift through the Father to the world. 
This motif holds within it the mysteries of the trinitarian life, creation, and covenant. It is 
the site of the original kenosis in which we glimpse the relationship between the Persons 
of the Trinity that form the backdrop for the Incarnation.
81
 The Incarnation is directed in 
two places: toward the Father and for the world. The Son offers himself up to the Father 
from all eternity, in the form of willing self-gift, fully in service of the Father.
82
 The 
Incarnation is an extension of this eternal “eucharistic attitude” of the Son.83 “Covenant 
and creation are not only rendered possible by the son’s ‘eucharistic’ response to the 
Father: they are ‘surpassed by it, since both of them can only become reality within the 
embrace of the Son’s response.”84 So all of creation, covenant, and Incarnation reveal the 
depth of the love between the persons of the Trinity and that each were involved in the 
salvation of the world.  
                                                          
 
80
 Balthasar, TD 4, 317. 
 
81
 This relationship will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 
82
 This trinitarian primal kenosis will receive a full treatment in Chapter Three. 
 
83
 Ibid., 331. 
 
84
 Ibid., 330. 
36 
 
 This motif of Jesus’s giving up of self for the world’s salvation is precisely the 
movement of divine kenotic love toward humanity, first apprehended by Christianity that 
forms the basis for all other forms of kenotic activity. It is this kenotic love that solves the 
terrible effects of sin and restores our relationship with God by contradicting all prior 
human attempts at reaching salvation: 
The primary reality is, not man’s movement from below up to the absolute, in 
order, if possible, to disappear in it, but rather, as Ignatius of Loyola emphatically 
repeats, the movement de arriba, coming down from above, in which God 
empties himself out in order to fill man up with his loving self-expropriation.
85
 
 
The Incarnation is the central answer to human sin, not because of the assumption of 
human flesh to divinize it, but because it reveals divine love for creaturely finitude. It is 
God’s pronouncement, once again, that creation is good. It is a healing and restoration of 
human finitude.  
 In sum, this first motif represents three levels of kenosis. The timeless gift of 
divinity that the Father gives to the Son is the first. The reason for the Son’s thankfulness 
toward the Father is because the Father fully surrendered all of his divine life to the Son. 
The second level of kenosis is the Son’s gift back to the Father.86  Finally, the third level 
of kenotic activity is the Father and Son giving themselves to the world. And all of this is 
to reveal God’s love for the created order and his restoration of that order through 
kenosis, not through coercive power. 
 It is through the third level of kenosis that Balthasar’s theology of mission enters 
into the drama. It is Balthasar’s unique concept of mission [sendung] that provides the 
unity of activity between the divine and human Jesus that he sees in the Incarnation. 
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Mission is at the living center of Balthasar’s action-oriented Christology. Mission is a 
sending. As Balthasar quips, “No one can give himself a mission.”87 Jesus places his 
identity within the external mission given him by the Father and in so doing grows and 
develops his sense of agency. Mission is essential to the development of personhood. In 
fact it is constitutive of personhood.
88
 This means that for Jesus, his personhood was 
something that was always his, yet developed as he followed his mission.
89
  
 The second motif, this exchange with sinners, is a classic expression of the 
biblical and patristic sources on salvation.
90
 This motif emphasizes the sacrificial and 
substitutionary aspects of salvation. Jesus takes on our sins and our punishment of death, 
and we receive the merits of his life and work. This exchange indicates a kenotic 
movement into two aspects: 
the first is ordered more to the event of Good Friday,the second more to that of 
Holy Saturday. In the suffering of the living Jesus, there is a readiness to drink the 
‘chalice of wrath,’ that is, to let the whole power of sin surge over him. . . . Sin’s 
impatience, as the sum of all world-historical sinful impatience against God, is 
finally exhausted in comparison to the patience of the Son of God. His patience 
undergirds sin and lifts it off its hinges. Of course: it is not quantities that stand 
here as rivals over against each other but qualities. The quality of the loving 
obedience of the Son toward the Father . . . is not to be compared with the quality 
of the hate that surges over him.
91
 
 
The exchange that takes place on Good Friday is an active and patient bearing of sin. 
Then within Holy Saturday, Jesus solidifies “his solidarity in nontime with those who 
have been lost to God. For these people, their choice is definitive, the choice whereby 
they have chosen their “I” instead of God’s selfless love.”92 Balthasar characterizes hell 
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as a person’s choice to serve his or her own “I” over God’s offering of himself. Yet even 
here, in this seemingly final choice, “the Son descends; but now he is no longer acting in 
any way but from the Cross is instead robbing every power and initiative by being the 
Purely Available One, the Obedient One . . . the absolutely cadaver-like obedience . . . He 
is dead with the dead (but out of a final love).”93 This obedience of Jesus and his 
exchange with sinners reaches its full dramatic tension in Hell where Jesus’s identity has 
wholly identified with the damned.  
 Unlike the mainstream triumphalist approach, which envisions the descent into 
hell as a “‘chaining’ and ‘robbing’ of the power of death-Satan-Hades, thereby 
interpreting it as a victorious journey”94 and treats the descent under the third motif of 
liberation as Jesus releasing the captives, Balthasar places it here, within the exchange of 
places, due to the emphasis that he gives to kenotic themes. In what is usually interpreted 
as powerful—overcoming the Devil—Balthasar treats as a divestment of power that 
overcomes evil through defenselessness and patience.
95
 This exchange is understood as 
going into the experiences of a damned person, which would be death and hell—total 
alienation and resignation. It is this exchange in which Balthasar’s logic of kenosis in the 
order of salvation reaches its extreme and “the omnipotent powerlessness of God’s love 
shines forth in the mystery of darkness and alienation between God and the sin-bearing 
Son; this is where Christ ‘represents’ us, takes our place: what is ‘experienced’ is the 
opposite of what the facts indicate.”96   
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 The third motif of salvation is the release of humanity from sin. For Balthasar, 
human sin is primarily an attempt to grasp freedom and power apart from God. Thus, 
humanity,  
in seeking to arrogate this power [divine power] to itself, finite freedom does two 
things: it separates power from self-giving goodness, and it sets itself up against 
the absolute good-thereby incurring the judgment of the latter. Judgment reveals 
that the usurped power is actually God’s power over the usurpers. The one who 
attempts to seize absolute power is overwhelmed by it; he has no defense against 
it. Seeking ‘liberation’ through total autonomy, he is so fettered by it (for total 
autonomy belongs to God) that release can only come from God.
97
 
 
The liberation that God offers humanity is from the cycle of power and grasping for 
autonomy. Salvation opens up the kenotic mode of life to humanity, inviting it to live in a 
way that disconnects human freedom from the mechanics of power struggles and 
embrace a freedom constituted by self-giving, loving relationships. In Jesus, who 
embraces self-emptying love, we are shown another way of acting that will grant us true 
liberation.  
 But this was not shown merely through teaching or example alone, but through the 
divine activity of the Incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus. Without these events, 
the power of death would not be broken: “only in absolute weakness does God want to 
give to each freedom created by him the gift of a love that breaks out of every dungeon 
and dissolves every constriction.”98   
 In the Garden of Gethsemane, for example, Jesus empties himself of his own 
wishes in favor of accepting the mission granted to him. Inherent within this mission is 
the refusal of divine force as the solution to the dilemma of sin. Instead the solution 
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involves “on the one hand, obedience to the Father (John 18, 11), and, on the other, a 
decision in favour of defencelessness–renunciation of the ‘twelve legions of Angels 
(Matthew 26, 53) countermanding the attempt to defend him (Luke 22, 51 and parallels) 
and the instruction to Judas, ‘Do your business.’”99 To defeat evil Balthasar argues that 
Jesus chooses obedience and defenseless love, rather than making use of force. 
 The element of obedience has double significance, first for the life of Jesus in 
refusing violence even in the face of suffering and, also, for Balthasar’s understanding of 
the journey of human transformation. Balthasar acknowledges that there is a disjunction 
and a jarring and painful effort in obedience. However, if sin is indeed an attempt at 
grasping autonomy, then obedience is the way to counter the sinful inclinations we find 
in our hearts. Balthasar says that, “by the grace of the Lord, renunciation leads the apostle 
not only to a new and promising fullness of earthly as well as heavenly gifts . . . and to 
the freedom of truth . . . and of Christ . . ., but also to an explicit sharing in the 
fruitfulness of the Lord’s redemptive sacrifice. . . . Only in the eyes of the world are the 
renunciations of Christendom something negative.”100 Balthasar claims both an 
immediate and eternal benefit from the salvation wrought by Christ. The way of attaining 
salvation is obedience.  
 Jesus’ “decision in favour of defenselessness” is an active, not passive choice in 
how respond to evil. Balthasar argues that 
for Jesus what mattered was not a form of self-perfection or a means of gaining 
knowledge. Rather, Jesus’ intention was to amortize all attacks of violence in the 
spiritual field, alchemizing them in the very arena that is the instrument of evil. 
For Jesus, evil is not only psychologically exhausted of its power when we refuse 
to resist it, but, more crucially, it is taken captive in its very essence.”101  
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Jesus’s kenosis, instead of being wholly resigned and passive, is courageous and 
engaging. It is the very mechanism by which liberation is achieved for humanity.  
 This element of defenselessness is not only related to the concrete obedience 
described above, but it speaks as a condemnation of any principle, way of life, or 
spirituality that would create coercion and competition in the service of autonomy. It is a 
cosmic rejection of violence and coercion. For Balthasar, not only does Jesus affect 
salvation but he discloses the form of creaturely life and fulfillment.
102
 Human 
flourishing cannot be achieved through violence. The hard-won liberation for the created 
order is achieved not through the use of power but in the subversion of it. Balthasar sees 
autonomous power has a threat to harmonious relationships. Even God, who has 
autonomous power, operates in the kenotic way of vulnerable self-offering. The 
constrictive search for autonomy and its pernicious effects on humanity are broken by 
Jesus through kenosis, and we are offered true freedom in proper relation with the 
Creator. That invitation to proper relation is discussed in the fourth motif. 
 The fourth motif is the invitation to respond to the freedom from sin, won by 
Christ when he stepped into the life of the divine Trinity. In this motif, Balthasar 
transitions from ransomed individuals saved from death and the futile search for 
autonomy, to the incorporation of the Christian into Christ’s life. For Balthasar, this 
immersion into the Cross, death, and Resurrection and mission of Jesus is the true 
pathway to the maximization of human agency. 
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 The work of Jesus was to bear up within himself all opposition to God, allowing it 
to exist within the infinite distance between the persons of the Trinity. This spatial 
analogy is meant to remind us of the distance, qualitatively speaking, that Christ went in 
Hell. He went there not only to identify with sinners but also to establish a place for 
sinners, in their rejection of God, to be encompassed within God’s own being. Because 
God is triune, this establishment has precedent within the self-emptying relations of God.  
We must remember that the creature’s No, its wanting to be autonomous without 
acknowledging its origin, must be located within the Son’s all-embracing yes to 
the Father, in the Spirit; it is the refusal to participate in the autonomy with which 
the Son is endowed. This negation, however, is restriction: it is the refusal to 
follow truth to the very end . . . . For the Son, following the truth to the end means 
making a fitting response to the Father’s total gift of himself by freely and 
thankfully allowing himself to be poured forth by the Father, a response that is 
made in absolute spontaneity and in absolute ‘obedience’ to the Father (and 
‘obedience here means the readiness to respond and correspond to the Father) . . . 
The creature’s No is merely a twisted knot within the Son’s pouring-forth; it is 
left behind by the current of love.
103
 
 
So the very rejection of Jesus and the kind of freedom that he offers is dealt with by God 
through the divine act of self-emptying, defenseless, absolute love, so that even in our 
most resistant state we are still taken up, in a manner of speaking, into to the patterns of 
the triune life. 
 Consequently, we are invited to let go of our resistance to God and enter into the 
autonomy of the Son in order to find our true personhood. It is this inclusive nature of 
Christ that is key to salvation. The follower of Christ “is given a unique participation in 
the Son’s uniqueness,” resulting in the “inexhaustible multiplication of what is once-for-
all and unique; thus it also permits each individual freedom to fulfill itself in an utterly 
distinct manner within the realm of infinite freedom.”104 This movement from 
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individuality to personhood will be discussed further in chapter five, but let me briefly 
state that the pattern that Balthasar envisions arising from these biblical motifs is one of 
human agency established through the patterns of self-giving. The autonomy end of the 
continuum, on the one hand, eradicates self-giving because it is a threat. The absorption 
approach, on the other, turns self-giving into self-annihilation. Both attempts do not 
successfully establish human agency but constrict it and do violence to it. 
 The fifth motif is the most comprehensive, identifying divine love as the thing that 
initiates all of God’s movement toward creation. The first key feature of this motif is that 
it is a triune God who loves. By keeping this at the forefront, we can refute the charge 
that Christianity believes in an abusive divine Father. The fifth motif balances all the 
other soteriological motifs, providing a clear defense against the argument that the Cross 
is “divine child abuse” being “paraded as salvific and the child who suffers ‘without even 
raising a voice’ is lauded as the hope of the world.”105 While it is true that Balthasar does 
indeed emphasize the Cross,
106
 it is far more accurate to say that the controlling concept 
is the sheer unanticipated course that divine love took in order to display love to his 
creatures:   
Every “risk” on God’s part is undergirded by, and enabled by, the power-less 
power of the divine self-giving. We cannot say that the Father is involved in ‘risk’ 
by allowing his Son to go to the Cross, as if only then could he be sure of the 
earnestness of the son’s indebtedness and gratitude. However, if we ask whether 
there is suffering in God the answer is this: there is something in God that can 
develop into suffering. This suffering occurs when the recklessness with which 
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the Father gives away himself (and all that is his) encounters a freedom that, 
instead of responding in kind to this magnanimity, changes it into a calculating, 
cautious self-preservation.
107
 
 
Balthasar’s vision of the Incarnation precludes understanding the Cross as “divine child 
abuse” because Jesus’s voluntary suffering and self-emptying is always undertaken 
within the context of trinitarian love. To think of the kenotic motif as separate from love 
is to fundamentally misunderstand it. 
 The second key feature of this fifth motif is that it is a loving God who effects 
salvation. This love is most manifest in the Incarnation itself. He most definitely sees the 
Cross and the descent as crucial aspects of God’s plan of salvation, but as parts of this 
expression of God’s love for his creation. “The word which God addresses to us is a word 
of love: he utters it in a loud, manly voice in broad daylight, almost menacing, causing 
man to start out of his dreams and take notice of what he hears—yet it is also a word 
whispered in the night, soft and alluring, beyond comprehension, a mystery incredible 
even to the strongest faith, which no creature, however long he lives, will fathom.
108
 The 
Incarnation is a waking up to a new reality in which God’s love has found us from a 
slumber in which we were unable to comprehend beauty, unable to understand the scope 
of our importance to the Creator. The Incarnation is that announcement of love from God 
and it is based in this announcement that Jesus’s sufferings must be understood. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this chapter aimed to review Balthasar’s christological and 
soteriological perspective. First, I reviewed his understanding of original sin as an 
impulse toward absorption or autonomy—both illicit and misguided attempts at securing 
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agency for humanity. Then I described briefly Balthasar’s theo-dramatic approach to 
Jesus Christ, which emphasizes focusing on the personal activity of Jesus rather than 
philosophical or historical investigations and uses that activity as the basis of a 
Christology that is neither purely high nor low, neither precisely from above or from 
below. Then, after a brief summary of understandings of kenosis in Christian thought, I 
intended to elaborate on Balthasar’s elusive and creative style that connects with the 
dramatic nature of existence. Finally, I analyzed the five biblical motifs of salvation 
through Jesus’s activity that Balthasar claimed represented the fullness of God’s plan of 
redemption. These five motifs each demonstrate Balthasar’s ability to to incorporate 
kenotic love into narratives of redemption. In a way, kenosis is the common thread 
running through these motifs. Each has a kenotic element that enhances and deepens 
Balthasar’s understanding of these metaphors. 
 Indeed, since the Incarnation encompasses every aspect of Christian theology for 
Balthasar, his usage of kenosis exhibited here exerts its influence throughout the other 
areas of Balthasar’s theology. Balthasar is perhaps one of the first theologians to truly 
work out a comprehensive operation of kenotic economy across virtually every major 
doctrinal category. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUPER-KENOSIS AND THE TRINITARIAN LIFE 
  One of this dissertation’s primary goals is to link the kenotic motif in Balthasar’s 
writings with his conception of human agency. The introductory chapter laid out 
Balthasar’s criticisms of alternative worldviews and highlighted his central concern: to 
protect creaturely integrity from the absorption and autonomy models of human activity. 
These models, while distinct, share an origin in the first sin as recounted in Genesis. To 
Balthasar, absorption and autonomy are mistaken attempts to ascend to God. Among the 
negative outcomes of these techniques are passive spirituality, attempts to transcend 
creaturely finitude (including suffering), and the fomenting of violent competition 
between beings for self-fulfillment. These techniques are a rejection of the pattern of 
kenotic spirituality connected to interpersonal love that Balthasar proposes. 
 The second chapter explored Balthasar’s christological employment of kenosis in 
the obedience of the Son toward the Father. Jesus’s earthly life was an expression of deep 
kenosis, a full self-surrender in love toward the Father and toward humanity. Since 
Balthasar sees Jesus’s earthly activity as unified with the Father and the Spirit, one of the 
major links between the ideas in chapter two and those of the current chapter is a close 
correlation between the activity as expressed in the economy of salvation and the inner 
trinitarian life. This chapter will address the multiple images of kenosis Balthasar uses in 
trinitarian thought. When read in its proper context, Balthasar’s trinitarian theology has 
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two modes that are significantly different from each other and that have different 
implications for the kenotic motif.  
  The first mode of trinitarian discourse is intended to awaken love and gratitude in 
those who encounter it through the language of excess. It is this mode that introduces the 
language of trinitarian death, super-kenosis, and risk. This mode is intended not to 
establish definitive epistemology toward understanding facts about God but to cultivate a 
deeper intuition of God’s excess and love. There is a discourse of poverty and wealth, 
death and life, kenosis and surplus that circles around the trinitarian mystery. This lends a 
distinctive flavor to Balthasar’s trinitarian theology. Rather than focus primarily on the 
singular and plural nature of God, it emphasizes the mystical and biblical encounter of 
God’s incomprehensible love. 
 Balthasar’s second mode of trinitarian reflection is more confident and polemical. 
This is the ontological mode. Balthasar attempts to infer from trinitarian doctrine an 
ontological answer to the philosophical problem of the one and the many. In this mode, 
Balthasar’s aim is not to initiate the disciple into the depths of God’s love but to argue 
that, because of its trinitarian God whose procession is defined by kenotic love, the 
Christian vision of human freedom is superior to other religious and philosophical 
traditions.
109
 In doing so he is offering a solution to the problems he identifies in the 
absorption and autonomy approaches: the trinitarian kenotic exchange of persons 
maintains a space for all that is non-divine (sin, human creatures, death). This space is 
what grounds the possibility of the highest human freedom not in competition with the 
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divine. Kenosis functions in this ontological mode as a way to protect personal freedoms, 
not only in the Trinity but also as the subtext for all human freedoms. So Balthasar sees 
kenosis as the guarantor rather than a stripping away of personal creativity and volition.  
Secondary Literature and the Context of Trinitarian Discourse 
 These modes and implications lead to a diversity of opinions in the secondary 
literature. One of the challenges in understanding Balthasar’s trinitarian and kenotic 
theology is the problem of metaphorical or analogical language. In the best-case scenario, 
Balthasar’s trinitarian theology evokes a paradoxical search for a mystical encounter. In 
the worst-case scenario, Balthasar’s speculations are contradictory and dangerous to 
human agency and go beyond faithful biblical interpretation.  
 In the secondary literature there are number of sharp criticisms and confusion 
related to Balthasar’s trinitarian theology. Some of these arguments fail to pay attention 
to or misconstrue the manner in which this language is employed to support Balthasar’s 
larger theological goal. Some critics attempt to downplay the difficulty of Balthasar’s 
thought by simply minimizing his more controversial statements. For example, Aristotle 
Papanikalou overlooks Balthasar’s more extreme language of suffering and abandonment 
in his definition of Balthasarian kenosis, averring that “kenosis, for Balthasar, is not self-
sacrifice, but the movements of self-giving toward the other in order to receive the other 
that are constitutive of divine and human personhood.”110 This is only a partial 
explanation of Balthasar’s concept of kenosis. It also includes self-sacrifice, poverty, 
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struggle, abandonment, and death. Papanikolou does not adequately address these darker 
realities.
111
 
 From a more critical standpoint, Karen Kilby chastises Balthasar for being 
“confident and detailed” to a fault in his description of the inner life of the Trinity, 
especially in Theo-Drama V.
112
 Kilby argues that the so-called trinitarian renaissance that 
has occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is not a faithful return to tradition 
but a hasty reaction to the Enlightenment strictures on epistemology and the resultant 
deistic model of God. She terms this theological movement “robust trinitarianism,” and 
identifies its trademark as overconfidence in describing (in Balthasar’s case) the inner life 
of God. 
 Kilby’s criticisms and proposed alternatives serve as an example of the ways in 
which many scholars misread Balthasar’s trinitarian thought. This section will explicate 
some of Kilby’s concerns to illustrate the importance of attending to the following 
internal contextual markers of Balthasar’s theological perspective: analogy, negative 
theology, biblical revelation, and theology of the saints. Balthasar’s trinitarian theology 
actually fits well with Kilby’s proposed alternative, but with one caveat which I will 
explain later.  
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 Kilby is concerned that a robust form of trinitarianism in some cases
113
 deviates 
too far from tradition, creating a climate for idolatry and encouraging a Christian 
triumphalism in the marketplace of ideas. She suggests an alternative that she names a 
“programme of trinitarian theological modesty.”114 This agenda of modesty is composed 
of a series of maxims.
115
 First, the order of discovery is important: elaboration of 
trinitarian doctrine is based on the epiphany that Jesus the Man is also the Christ. Second, 
the “theologian who is thinking about the meaning of ‘Father, Son and Spirit’ cannot 
forget, say, the narratives from which they . . . first learned to speak of God in these 
terms.”116 This means that, regardless of the level of abstraction employed in trinitarian 
discourse, one cannot jettison biblical narrative and the personal names of the Father, 
Son, and Spirit. And the third and final point is that modesty is a necessary attitude to 
employ in relation to explanatory power of trinitarian discourse. As theologians 
“believing in the Trinity, we are not so much in possession of a more fully textured 
concept of God than a mere Enlightenment deist has, but in fact much less than any deist 
in possession of any sort of manageable concept of God at all.”117 Trinitarian discourse 
comprises “patterns of affirmation that immediately defeat us.”118 For Kilby, a correct 
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trinitarian theology offers not a new avenue of exploration but a confessional boundary 
marker that lets the theologian know where to cease his or her speculations. 
  Putting Balthasar’s trinitarian language in its proper context requires an 
examination of four areas: the analogy of being, negative theology, the transition from 
biblical revelation of Christ to Trinity, and, briefly, Balthasar’s theology of the saints. 
This examination will help clarify some of the problems in the secondary literature and 
provide a context for understanding kenosis. 
The Analogy of Being 
 The analogy of being is articulated by the Fourth Lateran council as a way of 
governing and guiding our discourse and mystical encounters. The council’s documents 
posit a similarity and a greater dissimilarity between the world and God. Balthasar 
believed Thomas Aquinas correctly understood analogy as a way of preserving the 
ontological distinction between God and humanity.
119
 Growing out of this conviction, the 
pairing of similarity and a greater dissimilarity is an important aspect of Balthasar’s 
theological language because it allows us to differentiate between God and creatures, 
which are fundamentally necessary for understanding the gospel.
120
 
 Balthasar does not, however, rely on an external system of analogy to govern his 
language but prefers to envision the oscillation of the similar and dissimilar not in a 
philosophical system but in the hypostatic union. Christ is the concrete analogia entis. As 
Balthasar reflects, “I have thus tried to construct a theology and philosophy starting from 
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analogy, not of an abstract Being, but of Being as it is encountered concretely in its 
attributes . . . . God appears . . . in Jesus Christ.”121 This foundation in Christ of the 
analogia entis is significant because Balthasar essentially fuses philosophical ideas of 
language and being to the biblical revelation of Christ. The Incarnate One becomes a 
unifier of difference. Jesus’s activity does not fuse the human identity to the divine 
identity but instead provides a conduit to real participation in it.
122
 This real participation 
is kenotic, but, based in analogy and difference, presupposes the value of a life sacrificed. 
Kenosis is powerful because the self is valuable. Kenosis does not devalue of the 
physical; it affirms the physical. 
 With the idea of analogy, Balthasar’s theology shares Kilby’s commitment to 
adherence to the order of revelation instead of to a philosophical or methodological 
framework. Balthasar has taken a philosophical theory and brought it into the light of 
scripture, employing analogy to ensure that biblical revelation is central to the theological 
task. In the case of trinitarian theology specifically, Balthasar employs analogy in a way 
that allows him to make positive statements. While Kilby sees this as overconfidence and 
hubris, Balthasar sees it as being faithful to the witness of biblical revelation.
123
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 So how does analogy relate to the kenotic motif? Using this theme of analogy to 
expand on the motif of kenosis, it will be a general rule of interpretation that self-
emptying will bear within it a similarity and a greater dissimilarity. Human kenosis is 
qualitatively different from divine kenosis, and the economic revelation of kenosis in 
Jesus is subtly different than kenosis within the trinitarian realm. Analogy partly explains 
these differences.  
Negative Theology 
 To claim, as Balthasar does, that there is a real analogy between the created realm 
and the divine may seem to posit too easy a correspondence, one that could fall into error 
or even idolatry, as Karl Barth famously proclaimed.
124
 Balthasar, who welcomed a 
dialogue with Barth, acknowledges this, and poses the following question: “Is it not 
superficial to emphasize the analogies between God and the creature, not to mention 
between the trinitarian God and intraworldly multiplicity, to the point (seemingly) of 
ignoring the ‘greater dissimilitude’ that, nonetheless, remains fundamental for everything 
else?”125 Balthasar’s answer is to employ a modified form of negative theology.  
 Negative theology, as conventionally conceived, is a philosophical or speculative 
negation of names or attributes of God.
126
  However, as a philosophical system, it can 
overshadow the positive role of revelation, which is among Balthasar’s central concerns. 
Thus, just as he did with analogy he will do with negative theology. He will retain a sense 
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of positive revelation and anchor the use of negative theology not within an 
epistemological system but firmly within that revelation: 
Negative theology takes on a radically different meaning as soon as we set foot in 
the biblical realm. . . . What in the nonbibilical search for the primal ground 
almost necessarily appeared as something free from the limitations of personality, 
or something to be touched only in moments of ecstasy, suddenly steps forth with 
the full impact of a spiritual freedom as the one God who has from the very start 
already found man the seeker and now addresses him with his grace and his 
demand. This puts an abrupt end to all system-building and to every form of 
resignation.
127
   
 
For Balthasar, negative theology as a system of negation betrays its own goals, precisely 
because the role of negative theology should be to explode systems of thought, not secure 
them.
128
 While at the outset negation seems to preclude the possibility of a confident 
system, it is in actuality closed in upon its own assumptions. Balthasar’s version of 
negative theology affirms creaturehood, privileges divine revelation, and avoids an alien 
superstructure of negation, instead keeping the primary themes of scripture at the center 
while still acknowledging a dissimilarity present in all language spoken about God.  
 It is this positive element of revelation that really drives negative theology’s role 
for Balthasar. Negative theology is not so much about human epistemic limits (as Kilby 
seems to say) as it is about the excess of love that is the Divine Being. Because of the 
biblical revelation of God, “this awesome self-affirmation of God contains, as if 
incidentally, an absolute negation.”129  
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 In Balthasar’s interpretation of the great apophatic theologian Pseudo-Dionysius, 
he sees a “third step” in this process of affirmation and negation: the “hymnic.” 
Balthasar’s discovery that “the ‘hymnic’ is therefore for Denys a methodology of 
theological thinking and speaking”130 can also apply to Balthasar’s own thought. 
Balthasar’s “robust” language is not a confident overextension of propositional language. 
It is a deliberate heightening of tension that reaches a breakdown in the adequacy of 
human language and instead stammers after the “the liturgical songs of heaven.”131  
 It is at this point that Karen Kilby completely misses the mark. While her 
“programme of theological modesty” is an important corrective to some forms of 
contemporary trinitarian theology, she classifies the language of Balthasar’s super-
kenosis as something like enlightenment deists’ claims, meaning not that deists would 
posit a super-kenosis but that the linguistic style or intention of deistic claims about God 
stems from a mechanical set of propositional statements. So, when Kilby says that we 
have less of an understanding of God than the deists, she is speaking in terms of 
propositional statements. She judges Balthasar as if he were making propositional, rather 
than hymnic statements. If we use words as the deists do, of course what Balthasar is 
doing seems overreaching and ill-advised. But if we recognize the modesty and negative 
theology inherent in this hymnic and confident language of super-kenosis it will free us 
to ruminate on Balthasar’s robust language without expecting a concise and digestible 
definition of God under those terms.  
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 But, one might ask, do not most other theologians follow this form of negative 
theology to some degree and yet end up with much more modest depictions of the inner 
life of God? Undoubtably, Balthasar’s strain of negative theology does fit within the 
general themes of Catholic thought, but he is more willing than they are to see a link 
between negative theology, the economy of the revealed earthly Jesus, and the inner life 
of the of the Trinity. Balthasar believes himself bound to consider this avenue of 
approach and believes that it alone provides a true home for negative theology. 
 Rather than employing it as a way to stop human speech, Balthasar sees the 
incommensurability of God as an impetus to create more speech, to stretch the meaning 
of words. Balthasar purposefully uses provocative language in order to recognize that this 
excess of meaning is not an absence or a negative feature of Christian thought but one of 
the positive features of the Christian God. In this manner, he mimics the characteristics of 
love that he sees within the Godhead. 
 Negative theology relates to the theme of kenosis in this way: the hymnic 
element, instead of abiding in silence, ends up in an almost lyrical description of the 
depths of God’s self-sacrificing and reckless love. Just as human love has inspired a 
proliferation of sonnets, poems, letters, and songs, Balthasar is inspired to suffuse his 
discourse with kenotic themes, since self-giving is the highest form of love. Balthasar’s 
deep love for the creative mind flows from this theological stance. His unique collection 
of lay styles of aesthetics, and his affection for Goethe and other forms of literature 
confirm Balthasar’s commitment to a theology based in the language of love. In fact it is 
the form of God, the beauty of God, that comes to us in the form of Jesus Christ that so 
inspires his effusiveness. Rather than overconfidence, as Kilby claims, Balthasar’s only 
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crime is an excessive description of love. His confidence arises from being gripped by the 
self-giving God of love.  
Christological and Trinitarian Kenosis 
 Perhaps the most basic guiding principle for Balthasar when it comes to trinitarian 
thought is that there is an explicit connection between christological kenosis and 
trinitarian kenosis. While such an idea is not completely unheard-of in theological circles, 
Balthasar’s emphasis on it makes his work especially important for any attempt to 
reconsider the kenotic motif.
132
 For Balthasar all trinitarian language must cohere around 
the Incarnation and, more specifically, the Cross and descent of Jesus. As Rowan 
Williams argues, the central question of Balthasar’s trinitarian theology is this: “What 
does it mean to identify, as the definitive embodiment of God in human history, someone 
who declares himself abandoned by God?”133 Balthasar’s answer to this question relies, 
unequivocally, on the motif of kenosis: “There is only one way to approach the trinitarian 
life in God: on the basis of what is manifest in God’s kenosis in the theology of the 
covenant—and hence in the theology of the Cross—we must feel our way back into the 
mystery of the absolute” (italics mine).134 There are two important elements to this 
quotation. First, Balthasar explicitly identifies kenosis as the main theme in the covenant, 
the Cross, and the inner trinitarian life. Second, he again emphasizes that any theology 
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that properly understands this will suggest a blindness, a groping, through the dark to 
reach ultimate mystery.
135
  
 Yet, while we human beings feel our way back to the trinitarian realm by 
recognizing the kenotic form in Christ, the kenosis in the Trinity retains a depth of 
meaning beyond what is revealed in the Cross. The Incarnation reveals, in full truth, the 
contours of God’s character. Yet, because God’s character is a surplus of love and the 
Incarnation itself is a trinitarian act, there must be a depth of meaning that the Incarnation 
hints at that is beyond our understanding. This depth of meaning is the application of 
kenosis to the trinitarian life that “makes possible all other kenotic movements of God 
into the world; they are simply its consequences.”136 So, while the Incarnation is the 
height of revelation, mystically and eschatologically speaking, the Son’s kenosis and 
suffering in the world is a pale imitation of the force of love, recklessness, and abandon 
that is achieved within the Persons of the Trinity.
137
  
 Kilby’s views here seem to be more muted. She agrees with this general 
approach, i.e., from Christology to the biblical names of the Trinity, but she believes that 
Balthasar is too confident and excessive in his approach, going beyond the themes of 
revelation and perhaps recklessly entering the rarefied air of speculation. 
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Adrienne Von Speyr and the Theology of Saints 
 Up to this point, I have discussed the problematic nature of Balthasar’s language 
as viewed by some of his interpreters. I offered up the interplay of analogy, negative 
theology, and the positivity of revelation as a way to understand Balthasar’s trinitarian 
language. And, while Balthasar uses the language of groping and fumbling to describe 
trinitarian reflection, he also clearly studies and describes intimate details of the inner 
trinitarian life. Most theologians would not dare to broach this topic. What might account 
for this difference, for this staunch commitment to putting words to the mystery of God, 
this effusive discourse on the inner workings of trinitarian life even as he resists 
“systems”? There is a rationale for some of his most robust language. 
 As Chapter Four will explain in further detail, the saints, to varying degrees, 
become in Balthasar’s mind a fertile field of theological reflection within the bounds of 
biblical narrative and church teaching. The theologian must attend to the saint: 
For theologians, on the other hand, they [the saints] are rather a new 
interpretation of revelation; they bring out the scarcely suspected treasures in the 
deposit of faith. . . . Their sheer existence proves to be a theological manifestation 
that contains most fruitful and opportune doctrine, the directions of the Holy 
Spirit addressed to the whole Church and not to be neglected by any of her 
members
138
 (italics mine). 
 
This aspect of Balthasar’s thought is still underappreciated.139 The reason that he views 
the saints this way is his view of God’s love and communication as fundamentally 
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sacramental and excessive. God’s fullness knows no bounds and cannot be contained 
within the scriptures or the sacraments alone, but bursts forth in the lives of those who 
surrender themselves fully to him. 
 Balthasar’s most controversial and vivid depictions of the Trinity come from 
Theo-Drama V, which is suffused with references to the mystic Adrienne von Speyr. Von 
Speyr’s contemplative reading of scripture and her trinitarian awareness make their way 
into Balthasar’s mindset, and he sees it, perhaps too uncritically, as another source of 
revelation.
140
 Von Speyr’s thought holds special importance for Balthasar, not just 
because of their close relationship and his respect for her writings, but because Balthasar 
believed she ought to become a saint. So far this sentiment has not been shared in any 
official capacity by the Church. 
 This does not erase the problematic nature of Balthasar’s speculations, nor is it an 
attempt to lay blame on von Speyr for Balthasar’s idiosyncrasies, but I hope I have 
pointed out an often-overlooked rationale for why Balthasar would order his trinitarian 
formulations in relationship to her work. He sees in von Speyr’s writings a wealth of 
meaning that has come from God to her.
141
 Balthasar felt it was his task to introduce her 
importance to a wider circle. Her trinitarian reflections provide a way of deepening our 
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sense of what biblical revelation means. In the case of the Trinity, that involves paying 
attention to God’s work in the mystics. 
 The saints provide, as Balthasar put it, “a new interpretation of revelation.” This is 
precisely one of Kilby’s complaints: that robust trinitarianism is innovative in a way that 
is detached from tradition. But Balthasar sees neglected aspects of tradition at work in the 
saints that his theology might incorporate within it. So what seems to Kilby novel and 
disjointed from historic Catholicism Balthasar sees as an underexplored aspect of it. 
Super-Kenosis and Trinitarian Persons 
 While attempting to keep in mind the discussions about the mode or form of 
theological discourse laid out in the previous section, this chapter will shift in focus to 
some of the content of Balthasar’s trinitarian discourse. The theme central to this 
argument is the idea of super-kenosis. Balthasar’s strict emphasis on the events of the 
Incarnation leads him to link that kenosis with a prior and greater super-kenosis within 
the triune relations. This use of the prefix “super” signifies the operation of negative and 
analogical language. It contains within it the idea of negation and excess by indicating 
that this kenosis is the exact image of what we see in the Incarnation, but also “positively 
affirms” something “superior to all subsequent negations.”142 The affirmation and 
negation continue on together in this language of “super-kenosis” because of the ever-
greater aspect of the divine life.  
 So what is “super-kenosis” as Balthasar employs it? Balthasar believes that 
trinitarian love is always the mysterious and fruitful positivity of kenosis and that kenotic 
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love is what characterizes the processions of the Trinity.
143
  The pattern of kenotic love 
amongst the Trinity is one of full expropriation of self toward the other in love. Love has 
many facets, and the “kenotic” and “self-giving” are the terms Balthasar believes are best 
suited to indicating the wonderfulness and excess of love that he is so fond of expressing 
in his theological extrapolations. The following section will scrutinize how the kenosis 
motif appears in each person of the Trinity. This will allow for a new depth of 
understanding of the function and application of kenosis in Balthasar’s thought. 
 What is the hallmark of the kenosis of the Father? To him belongs a primal 
initiation, a first primordial kenosis in which the Father, “who was never a self-enclosed, 
all-knowing person” dispossesses himself in favor of the Son . . . and through the Son, to 
the Spirit.”144 The generation of the Son by the Father is seen not as an intellectual act but 
as an act of self-bestowal: “But the Father possesses it [divinity] insofar as he begets 
before thinking about it [unvordenklich]; he possesses it only as given away.”145 He gives 
the gift of divinity fully to the Son: “In the Father’s love there is an absolute renunciation 
of any possibility of being God for himself alone.”146 This kenotic activity grounds and 
surpasses the economic kenotic activity of Jesus.  
 Even though the initiative for the kenotic event seems to lie with the Father, 
possibly indicating that he is in control, Balthasar emphasizes that the Father initiates a 
situation in which he allows himself to be conditioned by the other in the Son and 
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entwines his reputation with the Son’s representation of him147 and characterizes this as a 
“risk” taken by the Father.148 This risk is not a hesitant, calculating sort but a reckless 
squandering of inexhaustible, infinite love for the Son: 
There are no in-built securities or guarantees in the absolute self-giving of the 
Father to Son, of Son to Father, and of both to the Spirit. Humanly speaking, it is 
a total surrender of all possessions, including Godhead. From the giver’s point of 
view, therefore, it could appear to be an absolute “risk”149 (italics mine). 
 
Yet the level and type of risk this kenosis poses is unclear. Scholars are divided on this 
issue. Linn Marie Tonstad argues that “the giver, the Father, revels in a seeming threat—
handing himself over entirely to another—yet never risks losing himself in this handing-
over, because he is always ontologically secured and guaranteed precisely in the event of 
handing himself over.”150 For Tonstad, the “risk” is really more of a charade because, in 
her view, real risk entails ontological instability. Because there is no ontological 
instability associated with the Father’s generation of the Son, any language of suffering, 
risk, or loss is an act. God, because he is self-giving, is incapable of risk. Bernhard 
Blankenhorn acknowledges the same ontological stability for the Father that Tonstad 
detects in Balthasar’s work but comes to a different conclusion. He simply states that 
“nevertheless, an eminent wager” still exists, “one that is beyond our comprehension.”151 
 Perhaps Balthasar’s criticisms of Karl Rahner can illuminate, at least partially, the 
importance of this discussion. Rahner comments, “I would say that there is a modern 
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tendency . . . to develop a theology of the death of God that, in the last analysis, seems to 
me to be gnostic. One can find this in Hans urs von Balthasar and in Adrienne von Speyr, 
although naturally much more marked in her than in him.”152 Balthasar responds to this 
line of criticism in the beginning of Theo-Drama V, saying,  
Karl Rahner has dubbed our theology “gnostic”; in all probability he will 
probably find his verdict even more strongly confirmed when he reads the chapter 
on “the pain of God”. We find his verdict unacceptable . . . . As this final volume 
of Theo-Drama comes to an end, it broadens out into what Karl Rahner rightly 
and emphatically refers to as the “mystery of God”. Anything we say, by way of a 
conclusion . . . is nothing more than an astonished stammering as we circle around 
this mystery. We have tried to go as far as revelation permits—some may feel we 
have gone one step too far.
153
  
 
Balthasar sees Hegel’s work on the pain of God as valid and important, yet, in the same 
introductory material of volume five, he distinguishes himself again from Hegel by 
making use of a quotation from Kierkegaard: 
The Hegelian babble about the real being the true is therefore the same kind of 
confusion as when people assume that the words and actions of a poet’s dramatic 
characters are the poet’s own. We must, however, hold fast to the belief that when 
God—so to speak—decides to write a play, he does not do it simply in order to 
pass the time, as the pagans thought. No, no: indeed, the utterly serious point here 
is that loving and being loved is God’s passion. It is almost—infinite love!—as if 
he is bound to this passion, almost as if it were a weakness on his part; whereas in 
fact it is his strength, his almighty love: and in that respect his love is subject to 
no alteration of any kind. There is a staggering perversity in all the human 
categories that are applied to the God-man; for if we could speak in a completely 
human way about Christ we would have to say that the words “My God, my God, 
why have you forsaken me?” show a want of patience and a want of truth. Only if 
god says it, can it be true, i.e., even if the god-man says it. And since it is true, it 
is also truly the climax of pain. The relationship to God is evidently such a 
tremendous weight of blessedness that, once I have laid hold of it, it is absolute in 
the most absolute sense; by contrast, the worldly notion that my enemies are to be 
excluded from it would actually diminish this blessedness.
154
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This quotation indicates that, while Balthasar is appreciative of Hegel, he is not following 
him completely. In fact, as Cyril O’Regan remarks, “Balthasar grants to Hegel, 
Moltmann, and even ‘death of God’ theologians, that too often—although far from 
univocally—the Christian tradition has peremptorily dispatched suffering or compassion 
from its figuration of the divine.”155 Balthasar takes into account the pain of God 
theologians and their concern, but points out, as the Kierkegaard quotation suggests, that 
to make God’s suffering mean that it somehow weakens him does not coincide with the 
biblical picture of God. He is concerned that it would make God’s own being depend on 
the world for his enrichment. Here again we see that Balthasar’s reliance on analogy and 
negative theology complicates but enriches the situation: “we approach the mystery from 
two sides, that is, from that of negative theology, which excludes as ‘mythology’ any 
notion that God has to be involved in the world process [Moltmann, Hegel]; and from the 
point of view of the world drama, the possibilities of which must be grounded in God.”156 
These possibilities include suffering and death but they do not mean what suffering and 
death mean. 
 But while Balthasar at least sets a clear boundary around the terms of the  
God-world relation, he is equally emphatic about the immanent Trinity:  
 The immanent Trinity must be understood to be that eternal, absolute self-
surrender whereby God is seen to be, in himself, absolute love; this in turn 
explains his free self-giving to the world as love, without suggesting that God 
“needed” the world process and the Cross in order to become himself (to ”mediate 
himself”).157   
 
In other words, the elements of the economic Trinity are grounded in the immanent.  
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Balthasar expressly rules out Rahner’s complaint that his theology is gnostic in the same 
sense as Hegel’s. But the problem left unresolved is how risk and kenosis can operate in 
the Trinity. One can surmise that the attribution of risk to the inner trinitarian life is, at 
the same time, more “risky” than anything exhibited in the God-world relationship. In 
submitting fully to the existence of the Son, the Father brings into existence an Other that 
is his equal. Kenotic love, in this primal instance, is the “letting be” of another. For 
Balthasar, then, it seems that true love implies a full recognition of the other, not in a way 
that endangers the ontological person of the Father but in a manner that allows room for 
the activity and interaction of another.  
 In chapter two we discussed the Son’s kenosis as typified by two attitudes: 
obedience to the Father and defenselessness. These two characteristics continue into the 
immanent Trinity in “the perfect obedience of the Son, who wants to do nothing else on 
earth but the will of the Father who sent him” (Jn 6:38). This is both the means and the 
content of his eternal relationship with the Father. Obedience is the central activity and 
the expression of that activity is to reveal the Father’s love. In the Son, the kenotic motif 
is expressed as obediential love. The nature of obedience in this context could be 
expressed in terms of receptivity or availability. When the Father gives himself fully to 
the Son, his gift is vulnerably awaiting completion by the reception of the gift by the 
Son.
158
 This reception is the meaning of obedience. The Son assents to the goals of the 
Father. 
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 The attitude of defenselessness is also present in the Son’s relation to the Father. 
Part of this relation is an implied distance or difference that allows for freedom. But it is 
also true that the Son uses this freedom in a manner that is wholly transparent to the 
Father and completely available to his wishes. It is this attitude or manner of relation that 
holds within it the kernel of the Cross and Descent, which is brought out because of sin.  
 Obedience, just like risk, does still leave us with some complications. Obedience 
implies a hierarchy—an uneven balance of power within the Godhead. For obedience to 
be the central characteristic of the Son within the trinitarian realm seems suspect and 
misguided. But when the Father’s attitude is also taken into account, the term 
“obedience” loses its one-sidedness and balance is revealed. As with all of Balthasar’s 
trinitarian constructions, it is important to keep in mind the dramatic character of this 
encounter—each member of the Trinity has moments of receptivity and activity. 
 Balthasar argues that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and is their 
mutual love enlivened. He argues that “the Spirit, must also be God if he is to be the 
‘personal’ seal of that self-expropriation that is identical in Father and Son. For the Spirit 
does not want anything ‘for himself’ but, as his revelation in the world shows, wants 
simply to be the pure manifestation and communication of the love between Father and 
Son (Jn 1:26).”159 The Spirit, as the bond of love between the Father and Son, remains 
withdrawn from the spotlight: “she gives place to Father and Son in a kind of kenosis 
(which is why she is so hard to grasp as a Person).”160 The Spirit represents an 
underdeveloped area in Balthasar’s thought that has a potentially important angle. In all 
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the other relations Balthasar describes—mother-child, Father-Son, male-female—there is 
a duality. But with the Spirit, the Spirit is always mediating between two others.  
In discussing the Persons of the Trinity separately, but entirely within their 
kenotic processions, it is also important to recognize the quality of their relationships that 
ensures they retain their “ontological security,” to use Tonstad’s term. While God is 
infinite, and superabundant, and his self-giving has no logical bounds, the self-gift of the 
Father to the Son does not include his paternity. The paternity of the Father is not fully 
given to the Son because this would result in the breakdown of the divine distance 
between them. Kenotic love always takes place within relations. When those relations 
dissolve, the result is self-annihilation, not self-giving. If one of the agents no longer 
retains his or her personal core, then we have run aground on the unyielding shores of 
absorption of autonomy. The trinitarian kenosis is meaningless if one of the Persons loses 
his or her identity in the emptying. 
While this ontological security of Paternity, Spiritness, and Sonship characterizes 
the trinitarian life, “this does not imply that the Father holds back something for 
himself.”161  The Father, in his very paternity, is available just as the Son and the Spirit 
are also completely available to one another. The Father, in his Fatherhood, is completely 
available and willing to do whatever the Son would ask. That is the manner in which the 
Paternity of the Father is available to the Son. Likewise, Sonship and Spiritness each 
retain a distinctive mysterious quality to them that is not eradicated in the kenotic 
operations. Indeed it is that ontological stability that allows kenosis to be a meaningful 
manner of activity. 
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Trinity as an Event of Love 
As Rowan Williams suggests, this plural nature is described in self-emptying 
terms: “if the otherness of God is true otherness and if it is in no way conditioned from 
beyond, then it can only be imagined as the action of love and freedom; and an act of 
love and freedom that causes real otherness to subsist can in turn only be imagined as a 
self-emptying, a kenosis.”162 The kenosis of the Trinity is not a static, ontological 
emptying but an infinite event of kenotic love between the Persons. This shifts 
conventional theological discussions of the Trinity considerably. 
What is at stake, at least in a perspective of depth, is an altogether decisive turn-
about in the way of seeing God. God is not, in the first place, “absolute power”, 
but “absolute love”, and his sovereignty manifests itself not in holding on to what 
is its own but in its abandonment—all this in such a way that his sovereignty 
displays itself in transcending the opposition, known to us from the world, 
between power and impotence.
163
 
 
This eventful nature that Balthasar perceives in God allows for a real, if qualified, sense 
of eternal becoming within Balthasar’s theology. God-as-event provides Balthasar with a 
sense of dynamic continuous excess of relational love. The Father continually gives all of 
himself to the Son, and the Son continually gives all of himself to the Father. The Spirit 
continually bridges this love and, at the same time, is this love.
164
  
 Because of Balthasar’s commitment to finding the Trinity in biblical events and 
envisioning the Trinity itself as an event, the death of Christ leads Balthasar to conclude 
that there must be something within the triune life that could approximate and surpass 
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separation and death. In an infamous and much-debated
165
 passage, Balthasar posits a 
kind of super-death in the Trinity: 
In giving of himself, the Father does not give something (or even everything) that 
he has but all that he is—for in God there is only being, not having. This total 
self-giving, to which the Son and the Spirit respond by an equal self-giving, is a 
kind of “death”, a first, radical “kenosis”, as one might say. It is a kind of “super-
death” that is a component of all love and that forms the basis in creation for all 
instances of “the good death”, from self-forgetfulness in favor of the beloved right 
up to that highest love by which a man gives his life for his friends.
166
 
 
The question that needs to be asked at this point is: does not this language of super-death 
in the triune life make death coterminous with love?
167
  The short answer is yes, but love 
is not prefixed with “super.” Balthasar is using the word “death” in a qualified way that 
he never does with the word “love.” Furthermore, the Father’s death metaphorically 
results in the life of the Son. What are the implications for placing an analogous form of 
death so highly within the trinitarian life? For Balthasar, death expresses the extent and 
depths of love. Death functions neither in terms of tragic finality nor as an idealized 
sacrifice, but as a point of powerful excess that serves to describe love: “Greater love has 
no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13, ESV). Death, 
within a dialogical structure of personhood, represents a respect for the value of the other, 
a creating of “space.” 
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 In the case of the Trinity, death does not mean the annihilation of the Father, but it 
creates a space for the unexpected and the spontaneous to occur. This primal death is in 
some sense of recognition of the Other, a giving space to the Other. The difference 
between Moltmann, for example, and Balthasar is that “Moltmann’s understanding of 
primal kenosis as divine withdrawal … takes its cues from the Jewish notion of zimzum, 
... [while] Balthasar’s idea of kenosis stem[s] from the Father’s generation of the Son.”168 
The added feature, for Balthasar, is that this Super-Death is gifted to the Son in a manner 
that does not withdraw from him but supports him in his own agency. Balthasar’s kenotic 
death is thus also called ecstatic self-gift. 
Ontological Difference  
 This primal trinitarian drama of kenotic love that Balthasar infers from the 
Incarnation and Cross, then, has import for the idea of ontological difference. This intra-
trinitarian exchange holds within it the mysterious yet very meaningful answer to the 
problems outlined in chapter one. More broadly, the Trinity is viewed as an answer to the 
entanglements of other philosophical traditions. Difference protects kenosis from 
becoming absorption because what is demanded of the Other is not the eradication of self 
(anti-difference) but the gift of self in freedom.  
 As mentioned in Chapter One, Balthasar continues to see the absorption and 
autonomy models of human activity as threats to human freedom. This same concern is 
present in his discussions of the Trinity, yet he speaks about it slightly differently. He 
says that “two approaches are barred us: the idea of a Father who generates the Son in 
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order to come to know himself as God and the idea of a Father who, because he has 
already known himself perfectly, generates the Son.”169 
 For Balthasar, the first approach is “Hegelianism.” The problem with Hegelianism 
is that the distance between God and the world is not preserved, which destroys the 
integrity that arises from separating humanity and the divine. While Balthasar’s primary 
concern here is that Hegel’s approach means that God is now under an external necessity, 
we can also see how the anthropological situation would be affected by this. Human 
persons within the world would then be either competing or cooperating for meaning 
with God. If God needs the world in some way, creaturely freedoms become unmoored 
and the created order becomes a stepping stone in God’s game of self-actualization. 
 The second approach mentioned in the quotation creates an improper hierarchy 
between the Father and the Son, which in terms of trinitarian doctrine means the Father 
exists at some prior moment in which he was not part of Trinity. The implications of this 
approach would be aligning Balthasar with Arianism. Going beyond the Trinity is a 
refusal to accept revelation, a refusal to cease speculation, and a form of hubris. This 
approach destroys the integrity of the Trinity. 
 This ontological difference is how Balthasar’s conception of God can be all-
powerful, yet vulnerable to the Other. 
By taking the loss of God into himself, God, on the Cross, formed a space within 
himself where those without God can dwell. Thus denial, diremption and 
alienation from the Christian narrative became a moment in that narrative itself. 
We may deny God, but he does not deny us. A Christian metaphysics therefore 
needs to reflect at the level of ontology precisely this inclusivity of the Christian 
narrative and, critically, its ability not just to think difference but also to think 
difference from itself. It has metaphysically to embrace its own negation, just as 
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the Christian narrative is able narratively to encompass the empty space beyond 
its own limits. This points in the direction of a metaphysics of kenosis rather than 
one of creation. This will be no less Trinitarian, of course, but will reflect rather 
the Trinity in action, transcending itself and engaging itself fully and at risk in the 
world. It will thus not be a contemplative understanding of Being as object of 
knowledge, even the knowledge which comes of faith, but will be historical or 
enacted Being.
170
 
 
Oliver Davies’s remarks in the quotation above point out that the trinitarian reflection 
Balthasar is enacting is not “an object of reflection” but a continuing historical event that 
mysteriously preserves the integrity of creation. 
 This ontological mode of Balthasar’s, in which he uses trinitarian doctrine to 
explain philosophical difference, does seem to validate Kilby’s concern, i.e., that 
Balthasar uses the Trinity as an explanatory tool to solve the deficiencies he sees in other 
religions and philosophies laid out in Chapter One. Paying close attention to the language 
discussed above should allow one to see that there is Balthasar significantly qualifies his 
description of super-kenosis. He seems to lack that subtlety when it comes to super-
kenosis’s ontological implications and his polemics against other philosophies and 
worldviews. 
Conclusion 
 Balthasar’s trinitarian theology considerably deepens the concept of kenosis in the 
following ways. First, he connects kenosis within the Trinity to biblical revelation. He 
attempts to find a way to elaborate on this connection, using analogy, negative theology, 
and his understanding of the saints in order to erect a theology that can not only explain a 
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real and passionate interaction between God and creatures but also reconfigure our 
understanding of divinity away from static omnipotence to an event of self-giving love. 
 Second, in terms of anthropological implications, it is now hopefully clear how 
the christological and trinitarian doctrines of kenosis open up a real space for human 
beings to utilize their freedom and seek their own meaning. This trinitarian and 
christological conception of kenosis is what gives Balthasar a way past the problems of 
absorption and autonomy discussed in the first chapter. 
 75 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SAINTS AND KENOSIS 
 The first chapter established what Balthasar identifies, for the purposes of guiding 
interpretation, as the outer boundaries of the kenotic motif: the concepts of absorption 
and autonomy. The next two chapters established Balthasar’s understanding of the 
kenotic motif as it was expressed in the divine manifestation in the Incarnation and Cross 
(Chapter Two) and also within the trinitarian relations (Chapter Three). These chapters 
established Balthasar’s constructive contribution to the concept of kenosis. The last two 
chapters will investigate Balthasar’s understanding of kenosis and human agency. While 
human agency and kenosis differ from divine agency and kenosis, it is important to 
Balthasar that human realities always maintain an analogy to the divine.
171
 This link, for 
Balthasar, is, perhaps, most clearly shown in the saints. 
Why the Saints? 
  It is perhaps unsurprising that, like many twentieth-century Protestant scholars, 
Donald Dawe is unable to connect mystical texts and the saints with theology. In his 
historical study of the the kenotic motif, these themes were muted. In fact, they barely 
merited a footnote.
172
 Unlike Dawe, Balthasar not only connects the saints and spirituality 
directly to doctrine, but he does so specifically through the idea of kenosis. For Balthasar 
the saints represent the “living gospel,” something that theological discourse can only 
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clumsily imitate,
173
 and a serious study of saints and sanctity is necessary to keep the 
lifeblood of the Gospel pumping through dogmatic expression. Saints, not theologians 
“are the authentic interpreters of theo-drama.”174  
 But the relation between the saint and theological expression should not be taken 
as permission for an anthropologically founded approach to doctrine.  It is not as if the 
whole of human experience exhibited in the saint is normative for theological expression. 
Instead, what is most important about the saints coheres around the external application 
of christological mission on their lives. This mission, not necessarily the personality or 
teaching of the saint, is what is most important. Yet this mission is not a monolithic or 
homogenous collection of themes that somehow blots out the uniqueness of each saint. 
Each mission, while christologically formed (i.e., bearing the stamp of obedience and 
self-giving), interacts with each person differently and makes different demands upon 
them.  
 This approach to spirituality means Balthasar sees an unlimited number of 
expressions of kenotic activity while still retaining a central focus on following and being 
transparent to Christ.
175
 It is similar to the actor finding his or her place within the 
narrative of a play. They each have a way of asserting their personalities and skills upon 
the project, yet they are working within a narrative that they did not create. 
 This multiplicity of missions and manifestations reinforces Balthasar’s suspicions 
of “systematic” or manualist approaches to theology. He equates the kenotic reality with 
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the “sign of Jonah,” indicating that the Gospel is a scandalous proposition that is not 
merely assented to intellectually but requires from the human person its own kenotic 
response: “Jesus refuses to give a sign in proof of his authority, such as would enable 
men to recognise him without risk, without committing themselves to him.”176 There 
cannot be one impersonal system of self-sacrifice that requires a set list of renunciations 
or that can be performed without uncertainty. 
 Instead the kenosis of Christ is concretely pluriform, and this is how the saints 
provide a “deepening of revelation.”177 If theological apologetics can never expect (nor 
should they try) to succeed in removing faith and scandal from the Gospel, then, as 
Balthasar sees it, the saints are the best option for constructing an apologetic for the 
Christian worldview.
178
 This focus on the saints allows for a multiplicity of descriptions 
of the Christian life and it offers a more direct and concrete description of Christianity.
179
 
“The Faith of the Simple Ones”: Main Themes for Interpretation 
 In Balthasar’s essay “The Faith of the Simple Ones,” there is a programmatic 
passage that provides the essential thematic elements for understanding kenosis and the 
saints. In what follows, I will exegete this text in order to find the unifying elements in 
Balthasar’s approach to the saints. These features can be seen at work in his discussion of 
the saints discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
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The same is true of the “images” of the Church’s saints, who come from 
the superfigure of the Cross and are readable only on the basis of the 
Cross. They, too, always stand, in one way or another, in the focal point of 
the covenant, at the point where the paths between God and man meet and 
intersect, and they can do this only in that unconditional obedience that 
has received various names in the course of the Church’s history but has 
always remained the same: apatheia, self-abandonment, indifferencia. 
This is always the point of fundamental acceptance of the embodiment of 
whatever God wills and is therefore a place of death (naturally this is the 
death of Jesus: 2 Cor 4:10), whether this death now expresses itself as the 
“dark night” (John of the Cross), as “dying in that one cannot die” (Teresa 
of Jesus), as the readiness to let oneself be shared out in every way 
(Thérèse of Lisieux), as the “whylessness” of love (Eckhart), or in some 
other way. Certainly, an elementary love of neighbor will always grow out 
of this attitude; but the decisive thing is that it does not keep its own 
measurement in its hand but that the fruitfulness for the world and for 
humanity of the life that is surrendered to God is ultimately something that 
God alone determines.
180
 
 
This paragraph encompasses all the major elements needed to understand and develop 
Balthasar’s understanding of the saints and their place in theology and the church. 
 First is the phrase “the images of the Church’s saints.” This indicates, succinctly, 
that the saints and the church stand in relation to one another. In fact, individual saints 
cannot be understood apart from the idea of the communio sanctorum. Both canonical 
saints and everyone else who participates in Christ are part of the communio sanctorum 
and through it become de-privatized and their personhood is defined in theological terms:  
Everyone who participates in the pneumatic body of Christ, shared out in 
the Church, not only becomes a member of the church community: he 
actually acquires an intrinsically ecclesial quality. Every theological 
person thus has whole spheres of community that are personal to him, and 
the interpenetration of these spheres constitutes the reality of the 
communio sanctorum with its mysterious laws whereby each can “be for” 
others through prayer, initiative and suffering on their behalf.
181
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The radical idea that the Church and all its members are not just individual private agents, 
determining their own lives, but are responding to the invitation to be a part of God’s 
salvific process—a role of “dependent participation” in various strengths—opens up a 
space “where others can receive freedom to act.”182 This participation creates agency in 
others. This is the idea of being de-privatized. Balthasar says that, “in a narrower and 
more intensive sense, it means that every man, insofar as he possesses complete human 
nature, has access through love and understanding to all that is thought and felt, done and 
suffered by other subjects possessing the same nature.”183 There is a real sharing of 
burdens and responsibilities taking place through these “mysterious laws.”184 
 The second aspect of this quotation is the description of “the ‘images’ of the 
Church’s saints as those “who come from the superfigure of the Cross and are readable 
only on the basis of the Cross”185 (italics mine). This sentence indicates, again, that any 
theological import that we procure from a saintly life extends only as far as that 
individual is transparent to Christ: “The authentic saint is the one who always ‘confuses 
himself the least with Christ and who, therefore, can most convincingly be transparent to 
Christ.’”186 In other words, the saint is not a separate source of doctrine but a 
continuation of christological doctrine. The elevation of the saints to theological 
importance in Balthasar’s work grows out of Christ’s inclusivity in the Incarnation. 
Christ’s kenotic availability is what allows the saints to act in a similar manner, not by 
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mere imitation but by mystically sharing the acting space made available to them through 
Christ.  
 In addition to the mystical/sacramental connection between Christ and the saint, 
the “superfigure of the Cross” also represents a clear theological starting point instead of 
an anthropological one. Balthasar wants to ensure that an examination of saints does not 
become tied to universal human desires or a reduction to psychological or philosophical 
foundations. He is not advocating a turn to the subject in his suggestion that theologians 
should study the saints. Rather, what remains most significant in the saints is that they are 
concrete representatives of a theological expression of divine activity, i.e., kenotic love. 
 The next significant phrase in this quotation is the phenomenon of “unconditional 
obedience,” “apatheia,” or “self-abandonment.” This nexus of words surrounds and gives 
coloration to the kenotic motif. These ideas permeate the whole history of spirituality 
and, as Balthasar here indicates, they are the sole point of evaluation of a saintly life. 
Every saint, no matter the time, culture, or context, must bear the kenotic stamp upon 
their lives to be considered authentic. Each saint elaborates on this motif slightly 
differently, allowing for multiple angles of observation, contemplation, and action.
187
 It is 
this variance that allows a fruitful elaboration of the parameters and meanings of kenosis 
for human agency. 
 The meaning of a particular saint’s life remains at some level mysterious. The 
saints are not fully accessible to us; the full meaning of their mission is hidden with God. 
As such, human measurements and methods, understandings of justice, agency, and 
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happiness will be stretched past their breaking points. God’s measurement and direction, 
not only of each saint but also of each theological person, will be the sole director and 
measurer of any activity, including martyrdom, death, and other difficult situations.  
 This again, poses a problem for dialogue with those of differing viewpoints from 
Balthasar. Balthasar claims that an inability to accept this pattern of kenosis as part of the 
Gospel is due to a lack of commitment to the person of Christ. Commitment and risk are 
required for understanding the full meaning of the Christian life, and it cannot be 
examined from an external objective vantage point. Balthasar declares that “Christian 
existence is always doomed to draw the shorter straw, because there is no earthly scale of 
measurement which can be applied to its contents. Such a scale of measurement cannot 
and must not exist, if faith is to remain itself.”188 Faith and kenosis presuppose a certain 
existential stance toward truth—that it cannot be examined from an external, objective 
vantage point. 
 External safeguards, an internal logic, and ecclesial discernment guide us as we 
discern not only the meaning of saintly missions but also our own individual missions. 
The proposal that risk and commitment are central to understanding Christian 
discipleship in addition to God-granted individual missions seems to allow individualistic 
interpretations kenosis’s meaning. But Balthasar recognizes that there is an internal order 
and logic to his position that, to some degree, can be demonstrated through the saints to 
those who are willing to see it. 
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 The saints are to be assessed by the apostolic authority of the Church. The 
individual saint is declared to be a model worthy of emulation through a careful process. 
The Church protects the faithful laity from error by publicly recognizing the saints who 
have aligned themselves with the Gospel. Yet, even with the addition of ecclesial support, 
faith requires us to suspend our own ideas of what success and failure, freedom and 
bondage, death and life, suffering and bliss might mean, in favor of meanings that we 
grasp as we contemplate God’s mission for our lives.  
 The main premise of this chapter, in terms of kenosis, is that the central pattern of 
self-giving identified in Christ becomes multiplied and contextualized in the missions of 
the saints. So, it follows that each saint, to a greater or lesser degree, could reveal how 
human agency and kenosis might operate in the human realm. It makes sense, then, to 
examine what Balthasar says about certain saints, in hopes that it will reveal the many 
possible movements of kenotic activity.
189
  
 The rest of this chapter will deal with Balthasar’s treatment of individual saints: 
John of the Cross, Thérèse of Lisieux, and Elizabeth of the Trinity. These three provide 
additional color to the motif of kenosis, because each saint enacts it differently. This 
discussion will, I hope, allow for a more nuanced picture of kenotic activity. 
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John of the Cross and the “Scream of the Vivisected Soul” 
 
John’s spiritual way is well known for its emphasis on radical darkness, Neo-
Platonic influences, and renunciation of earthly pleasures. If the language of self-
annihilation is to be found anywhere in the Christian tradition, John of the Cross would 
be a likely source. As such, John of the Cross could be one of the best challenges to 
Balthasar’s conception of the positive connection between human agency and kenotic 
practice.  
Despite Balthasar’s recognition of the ubiquitous presence of “massive negation” 
found in the Carmelite’s poetry,190 his understanding of the context in which to situate 
this experiential “negative” language so that it can be interpreted in positive terms. 
Calling John’s poetry “decisive” for a proper understanding of the saint, Balthasar 
resolutely argues that all of John’s descriptions of dark nights are only in the service of 
love, that his mystical theology is one of profoundly biblical proportions, and that the 
trinitarian background to his contemplative worldview enhances the reality of the 
individual soul. In a provocative and comprehensive passage, Balthasar states:  
We are now a long way from Bonaventure and the whole Neo-Platonic 
ascent by stages from type to archetype. We are closer to Francis, but 
closer still to the remorseless sword of the Gospel word, which for the 
love of the One demands the hatred of everything else. And the sword 
must pierce to the division of the joints and marrow of the soul, the 
division of the soul from itself, before the promise of the hundredfold can 
be fulfilled on earth. To bear witness to this, poetry must therefore begin 
inside the division, as the scream of the vivisected soul in the middle of 
the night, in order to end in the song of praise of the soul, even more fully 
alive at a deeper level, wounded in the fire of glory. It is the fiery arrow of 
the seraph (John explicitly quotes this) that pierces the souls of Francis 
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and Theresa-beyond pain and pleasure, wound and health, life and 
death.
191
 
 
There are several aspects of this passage crucial to Balthasar’s interpretation. What he 
sees operating in John is not an abstract radical philosophical mysticism but an invitation 
that stems from the Gospel itself. Clearly, since Balthasar’s project is to uphold the worth 
of self and maintain a relational understanding of the self in light of the liberating power 
of the Gospel, the language here should raise concern. If Jesus proclaims healing to the 
brokenhearted (Luke 4), how does a “scream of the vivisected soul” bring healing? If the 
soul is annihilated, how can it become well? For John of the Cross (and for Balthasar) it 
is through the resurrection that these experiences of night do not overwhelm.
192
  In 
Balthasar’s interpretation, then, what John is calling for is not renunciation in and for 
itself but instead a transparent attempt to arrive at the depths and pleasures of trinitarian 
love. For Balthasar, in John the self comes into a new level of reality, more intensely 
glorious than the first. For this vivisection is not a ruthless and pointless experience but 
one that results in personal agency, understood as being “even more fully alive at a 
deeper level.” This is an attempt to shed an illusory self in favor of a true self, not an 
attempt by John of the Cross to annihilate his own personality. 
 Yet Balthasar is not entirely satisfied with John of the Cross. While John paints a 
vivid picture of the relationship of the soul with God, Balthasar sees an unfortunate 
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absence of the social, ecclesial, and human element to his worldview: “Where, in the 
whole of John’s work, is the neighbour? Where is the communion of saints? Where is the 
Johannine criterion for love of God: love of the brother? This is taken for granted and 
receives no special emphasis, just as the Church in all her visibility is taken for 
granted.”193  While leaving that area underexplored may have been acceptable in John’s 
own context, Balthasar will not let that be in his own work.
194
  This also demonstrates 
that an individual saint, no matter how great, can only exhibit a partial revelation of 
Christ. 
 In sum, Balthasar views the dark night as part of a larger journey into trinitarian 
love. This love then provides not only an affirmation of the self in terms of a relation with 
God but also avoids describing the Gospel only in terms of suffering. Yet, as Balthasar 
noted, John does not provide us a sufficient understanding of a relationality among 
neighbors, the church, and our enemies. This will need to come from another source. 
 John’s life and mission do reveal a positive aspect of kenosis: For John, 
renunciations are a way of prioritizing in his spiritual life. His priority is to reach the 
trinitarian love of God. For him this involves rejecting many legitimate good things in 
recognition that there is something better. 
 A kenotic attitude such as this will bear with it a sense of loss, since there are 
legitimate goods that are sacrificed (physical comfort, rest, family), but it is absolutely 
crucial to see that, for John, pain is not central to achieving his goal but a by-product of 
it. This isn’t to make light of his spiritual and physical suffering—sometimes it is very 
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real and overwhelming, making it difficult to see anything else. It is merely to point out 
the difference between the spirituality of John and the spirituality of absorption described 
in the first chapter. In the absorption model, the physical world and the human body is 
illusory or evil, and all who enjoy its fruits are deluded. In the absorption model, pain is 
interpreted as the reality of the soul extricating itself from its unworthy material prison. 
For John, the pain involved in his spiritual journey is felt because the rejection of earthly 
things is rejection of something truly good in favor of something deeper and greater. In 
addition, his end goal is not an ontological absorption (which would mean death) but a 
union in difference. 
 The area where John fails us, or at least is silent, is the connection to community 
and to the neighbor. John’s spirituality lacks an explicit and deep connection to ecclesial 
and human relationships and, without an explicit connection to the communio sanctorum, 
the meaning of the contemplative journey for the entire Church and world is lost. John’s 
sense of agency and his mission represent a relentless struggle to prioritize full surrender 
to God in all things, yet his approach lacks the communal quality that Christian self-
surrender has within it. 
Thérèse of Lisieux and the Little Way 
 According to Balthasar, Thérèse “understood the act of total surrender to the 
triune God as the highest possible form of engagement on behalf of the world’s 
salvation.”195 Right away, we can see that, in Thérèse, there is this explicit ecclesial 
connection between her surrender and the wider community. This highest act, again, is 
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the phenomenon I am describing as kenosis. So how does this phenomenon interact with 
Thérèse’s sense of agency and purpose? In order to understand this we will have to 
examine her “Little Way,” her particular path to full agency and existence.  
 What is interesting to note here is that her own fulfillment and happiness, while 
implicit in her spirituality, is by no means the central piece. In fact, in many places her 
own happiness seems barely sustainable. But, in the absence of its overt presence, 
happiness is allowed to find its true home. According to Balthasar, the conventional 
models of ascent from the more overtly platonic spiritual sources tend to have eros as 
their driving force. This is the individual’s relentless will toward unity, toward love, 
toward contemplation of the divine. But for Thérèse, even this eros is stripped away from 
her:
196
  “The ‘little way’ that Thérèse now constructs comes from renouncing everything 
in Christian love that seems to lend it greatness, power and glory. Love is brought to a 
state of weakness in which it learns the power of divine love, of littleness and darkness in 
which the greatness and glory of divine love are displayed. The basis of the little way, 
therefore is one series of renunciations after another.”197 While an eros-driven spirituality 
may not be undertaken to seek greater power or glory, it is definitely undertaken with an 
ascending mindset. Thérèse’s little way is not ascending but instead allowing herself to 
be active in continual renunciations with no attempt to move beyond them. The little way 
expresses the kenotic motif in terms of the simple, hidden moments in life when one can 
minister to another. Unlike John’s poetic vision of the individual and God, Thérèse’s 
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kenotic expression is oriented toward serving others in addition to God with small, 
concrete acts of kindness.  
 In fact the aspect that Balthasar most praises is her ability to renounce even self-
measurement: “more important even than the renunciation of her strength is her 
renunciation of progress.”198 This particular moment adds something new to descriptions 
of the kenotic motif. Obviously Thérèse’s actions themselves, small and large, were 
intended to decrease her “self.” Yet, at an even deeper level, it was less about a conscious 
movement to decrease herself and more a focus on ministering to others, even the divine. 
In one of her most striking passages she observes that “it is up to us to console Jesus, not 
up to him to console us.”199 This incredible statement indicates a total focus on God, 
placing all spirituality in relation to God and not on our own holiness or our own mystical 
states.  
 Yet Balthasar points out some shortcomings of her spirituality that, curiously, 
might lean toward the autonomy approach: her radical disposition toward suffering; 
Balthasar cautions that at some points Thérèse seems to go over the edge into masochism. 
One may seriously wonder whether Thérèse does not go too far with this 
line of thought [glorification of suffering] and actually fall into the 
excesses of ‘existentialism’. If so, it arises out of her need to bring all her 
life into the clear light of consciousness so as to reflect upon it . . . . She is 
meant to suffer; doubtless she is right. But she seizes upon it so eagerly 
that there is little room left for God to propose any other destiny. It is, as it 
were, on her own initiative that she compresses suffering and happiness 
into a synthesis.
200
 
 
One of the reasons this might fit the autonomy model is that Thérèse seizes on her own 
initiative in order to suffer and seems to equate suffering with happiness. It is not like the 
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absorption model, in which suffering leads to a purification of the creaturely in favor of 
an ontological fusion with the divine. Instead she confidently pursues a spiritual ideal of 
her own choosing as the way to maximize her spiritual life.
 201
 
 One of the distinctive features of Balthasar’s brand of kenotic activity is the 
distinction he makes between it and suffering. This is clearly an advantage that Balthasar 
works from this view. It allows his spirituality to relate to suffering in a way that does not 
glorify it but does not dismiss it. For Balthasar suffering is perhaps inevitable, according 
to the biblical record, but it should not be sought out in the name of self-abandonment. 
Balthasar cautions us precisely at this point of suffering in Thérèse’s life that is crucial. 
Kenotic spirituality is letting go of our own assumptions about what spirituality is and 
what God is calling us to. The mistake Thérèse made, he reminds us, was to assume that 
suffering must be God’s calling for her. It may not have been her destiny.  
Balthasar’s spirituality is flexible, truly capable of dealing deftly with various 
situations because its only constant is the will to obey and the ability to suspect one’s 
own judgments in order to follow God’s mission. So what does this description of 
Thérèse teach us about Balthasar’s vision of kenosis? First, he praises her ability to move 
beyond self-assessment in her spiritual progress. This fits with his allergy to all system 
building, disdaining it as a way for humanity to attempt to exert control over their 
relationship to God. The spirituality of kenosis is the alternative to this attitude, and 
Balthasar sees it at work in her life in a divine way. Furthermore, Thérèse’s tendency to 
always accept or seek suffering breaches the earlier ideal of letting go of self-assessment. 
                                                          
201
 Ibid. 
90 
 
In her decision to fully embrace suffering, not only did she improperly fuse her happiness 
with it but she too quickly grasped it as God’s will when there may have been another 
path for her. 
Elizabeth “the Vanishing”202 
 Elizabeth of the Trinity represents another great saint in Balthasar’s account, and, 
although her style can at times lean toward what he calls the kitsch,
203
 he sees in her a 
deep earnestness and radical one-sidedness
204
 that provide something of merit for the 
theologian. Like John of the Cross, Elizabeth expresses a remorseless and unapologetic 
desire to strip everything down to the barest of forms in order to grasp the one central 
thing, the love of God for his children. Even Elizabeth’s own happiness is relegated to the 
background in this quest. 
 In terms of kenotic activity, this stripping down is presented eloquently in the 
theme of self-forgetfulness. She says that “the secret of peace and happiness lies in self-
forgetting, in no longer being preoccupied with oneself.”205 This self-forgetting, 
Balthasar claims, simultaneously becomes for the soul the forgiveness of her sins and a 
recognition of the overwhelming power and endless scope of grace.”206 
 It is acknowledged that all this language is very one-sided and imbalanced. Yet it 
provides clear access to a truth that otherwise might be muted. Balthasar believes it is a 
timely reminder to the church.
207
 But its one-sidedness means that the radical call to self-
forgetfulness in the light of God’s love might harbor within it some aspects that need to 
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be qualified. One of Balthasar’s concerns about Elizabeth is her ability to withdraw from 
the world to such a degree, and he raises the possibility here, just as in Thérèse, that 
Elizabeth “almost seems to view with a sort of pleasure the wasting and burning her 
sickness causes her.”208 In both of these instances, Balthasar writes in positive terms 
about kenosis and spiritualities that he admires, but remains sensitive to the issue of 
glorifying suffering.  
 Though he identifies this glorification of suffering as an impulse toward the 
autonomy model of understanding kenosis, it also calls to mind the spiritual ideal of 
absorption. Is all this self-forgetting to be taken to mean that a person ceases to exist? In 
this instance, Balthasar believes this is emphatically not the case that, as in John, only the 
illusory self is left behind. “The ever-repeated wish to lose herself in God in the Endless 
One, is thus, not a metaphysical desire [italics mine], but a simple movement of love . . . . 
‘To lose oneself’ must be understood here in the sense of the Lord’s commandment—in 
the loss of one’s own soul lies the key to entry into the kingdom of love, in which the ‘I’ 
indeed, but not a single ‘Thou’, is lost.”209 I think this means that, according to Balthasar, 
Elizabeth never requires the true self (“thou”) to be turned over to God in a way that 
annihilates it. The movement of finite love toward one who is infinite is simple. In the 
process the false self (I) that Paul refers to as the “old man” does become obliterated. 
This is why Elizabeth feels such freedom and joy in her self-forgetfulness. It is a leaving 
behind of an illusory version of herself in exchange for one who is fully alive within the 
presence of God.  
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 Elizabeth’s life exhibits a clearer connection between happiness, agency, and self-
surrender than those of the other saints discussed here. She seems more willing to allow 
the language of happiness to be paired with that of self-forgetfulness. Yet her embrace of 
suffering and her tendency to withdraw from the world, border on the problematic 
absorption spirituality
210
  Here, the language of happiness, when combined with her view 
of suffering, poses the risk of a dangerous conclusion, not just for human agency but also 
for the nature of spirituality in general. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this chapter has brought to the fore several themes for the 
understanding of kenosis, Balthasar, and human agency. First, the saints (and all non-
sainted Christians) become persons through participation in the kenotic activity of Jesus 
within the communio sanctorum. This kenotic activity is then passed onward through the 
Holy Spirit’s activity and allows individuals to become true persons. Second, the lives of 
the individual saints and Balthasar’s commentary on them reveal more clearly some of 
the patterns of kenosis in human agency. According to his interpretation, the saints all 
undertake renunciations in the name of the love of God. They approach this love in 
various ways but they do not practice anything that we might call metaphysical self-
annihilation, and he is willing to criticize these saints when they veer too close to a 
glorification of suffering or a hostile view of earthly realities. This points to Balthasar’s 
distinguishing between kenosis and the twin problematic poles of absorption and 
autonomy. Rather than absorption or autonomy, he identifies these saints’ goal as the 
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stripping away of the illusory self, which is painful, allowing one to find true agency and 
happiness.  
 One question that lurks behind all three saints’ attitude of unconditional 
obedience is the possibility of death as an event that will be experienced by the saints. 
While not perfectly articulated in Balthasar’s description of saints, this theme is 
obviously connected with kenosis and agency. This is particularly difficult for the 
contemporary situation because it appears that a kenotic spirituality is inherently driven 
toward death, as in the case of suffering. Since the saintly life is christologically formed, 
death is an inevitable part of Balthasar’s spirituality. Because he sees the communio 
sanctorum as a continuation of Jesus’s salvific work, death will always be a part of 
Christian experience. Resurrection is also there and it is hidden with the fruitfulness of 
the saint. For Balthasar the true meaning of the saints and their impact on the world 
cannot be penetrated fully.  
 Finally, Balthasar’s description of kenosis in the lives of the saints provides both a 
social dimension to kenosis and an open-ended respect for divergent spiritual paths. In 
fact his theology demands that each individual receive a specialized mission from God. 
This means that for Balthasar human agency is achieved in numerous ways and depends 
on divine guidance to understand how this is best achieved. The saints present a concrete 
experience of the theme of difference.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
KENOSIS AND THE SPIRITUAL PATHWAY TO AGENCY 
The preceding chapters demonstrated the vital importance of the motif of kenosis 
in Balthasar’s theology. This chapter represents a continuation of that theme within the 
realm of spirituality. In brief, spirituality will be defined here as Balthasar refers to it: 
“revelation . . . realized in practice.”211 God’s revelation is what creates and defines 
spirituality. Within the context of this final chapter, then, the relation between human 
agency and the activity of self-surrender present in the kenotic motif will be investigated 
in depth. First I will address the relationship of theology to spirituality in Balthasar’s 
preferred mode, focusing on the gospel as the unifying factor and norm over all 
spirituality. Following this, I will explore themes germane to Balthasar’s 
conceptualization of spirituality—philosophical difference, the scandal over spiritual 
systems, personalizing mission, and discernment—and how these themes may interact 
with Christian perfection, self-love, human agency, and human relationships. 
The Relationship between Theology and Spirituality 
 There are three ways of relating the academic study of spirituality and theology. 
The first way is to separate them completely. This approach has been a viable option 
since the scholastic era. The assumption of this approach is that spirituality and theology 
have completely different goals, methods, and authorities. Spirituality centers on 
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affective experiences, mystical writings, and spiritual practices. From this perspective, 
mystics such as Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross end up as “lyrical poets” leaving 
“dogma to the prosaic work of the School.”212 In contrast, theology centers on an orderly, 
comprehensive, and rational defense of Christian beliefs. This perspective dominated 
Catholic theological centers of study during Balthasar’s own time.213 
 Another perspective to spirituality and theology would be to privilege one 
discipline over the other. The tension between spirituality and theology was heightened 
with the advent of the Enlightenment. Some Christian thinkers, such as John Toland, 
treated spirituality as irrational and superstitious. In his attempt to make Christianity 
more palatable in the Enlightenment context, he located the essence of Christianity within 
the explanatory power of reason.
214
 Admittedly, John Toland’s approach is a fairly 
simplistic example. His contemporary Friedrich Schleiermacher, on the other hand, went 
in the opposite direction, identifying the essence of Christianity with the feeling of 
absolute dependence. This allowed piety and spirituality to become normative rather than 
creedal and propositional dogmatic statements.  
 The final option, the one Balthasar advocates, is to view spirituality and theology 
as mutually beneficial. This approach can contain a wide variety of perspectives yet it is 
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in many ways a return to the earlier style of the Church Fathers in which “the subsequent 
separation of theology and spirituality was quite unknown to them.”215 But Balthasar is 
too erudite a thinker to suggest that we can or should simply return to that earlier 
mentality. In order to rightly rejoin spirituality and theology, it will take some 
constructive work. To advance this cause, Balthasar argues that theology and spirituality 
have to retrieve and explain anew “the objective spiritual medium” that was present in the 
earlier eras of the Church’s history.216  
Gospel as Norm  
 This “objective medium,” as Balthasar called it, is the gospel. The experience of 
the gospel is the personal integration of God’s revelation. Through the spiritual journey, 
the disciple discovers a deeper and more fundamental definition of self within the 
narrative of God’s love in the Incarnation. The spiritual journey, anchored in the biblical 
revelation and investigated through the discipline of theology, brings spirituality and 
theology together within the depths of God’s revelation. There are two important 
characteristics of the gospel: the hard sayings of Jesus and the proclamation of the good 
news. They provide the normative test for all spiritual practices. This means that a 
spirituality based on “good news” and “hard sayings” will retain a paradoxical 
perspective. On the one hand, the Gospels portray the Christian journey as an easy yoke 
and promise to liberate captives. On the other, Jesus asks the disciples to leave all they 
have and share in Christ’s sufferings. The Christian is invited to follow Christ through 
death on the Cross and into Resurrection. An authentic spirituality, then, will reflect this 
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dramatic existence that connects in the participation of Christ both joy and suffering, 
poverty and wealth, passivity and activity. The gospel is the narrative framework from 
which theology, spirituality, and the formation of the self receive their meaning.
217
 
Christians, following Balthasar’s model, “identify our ‘selves’ not with the isolated acts 
and facts of our lives but with the meaning they come to represent in being narratively 
interpreted. We can judge past and prospective actions in light of how they further or 
weaken, enrich or impoverish, the self of one’s narrative identity.”218 In spirituality, the 
Christian appropriates that narrative in order to subjectively adopt “a life story that is 
genuinely meaningful and fulfilling” based on the biblical narrative.219   
 If the gospel is the unifying medium of theology and spirituality, then kenosis is 
the primary motif that travels easily from the doctrine of God and the Incarnation into 
spiritual practices and ethical perspectives. I will show throughout this chapter that for 
Balthasar, kenosis is the link between the objectivity of the gospel and spiritual practice. 
The gospel reveals the self-giving patterns of the triune God and then, through the Holy 
Spirit, places these patterns within the human being, reshaping the previously amorphous 
spiritual desire into a decisive form: 
from now on the human (and a fortiori the Christian) spiritualities can no longer 
be detached from the ultimate meaning that they have received in the form of 
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revelation of Christ: from now on, there no longer exists an abstract general 
concept for the various forms of spirituality (although it was possible earlier on 
for such a general concept to exist only in a quite imperfect, analogous manner): 
rather, their concrete and unique general concept is Jesus Christ, who bestows 
their only acceptable specific meaning on them out of the unity of his triune 
love.
220
 
 
This quotation reveals some very concrete outcomes that keep Balthasar’s understanding 
of kenosis from veering into the possibility of self-annihilation or an alienating 
autonomy. The self-giving event of love, revealed in the Incarnation, becomes for 
Balthasar a fulcrum that balances the extreme discourses of kenosis. In light of the 
Incarnation, Balthasar distills four themes of a Christian spirituality of kenosis: the 
philosophical presupposition of loving difference, kenotic spirituality as a scandal, the 
enhancement of individual agency through personal mission, and the role of discernment 
in the spiritual practice of self-surrender. 
Philosophical Difference and the Spirituality of Kenosis 
 This revelatory event is grounded in the philosophical presupposition of 
difference as the possibility for authentic love. Ontological difference between the divine 
and human serves to strengthen and clarify the operation of kenosis and its relation to the 
self: “It is absolutely not true that love requires the abolition of personality . . . how sad it 
would be if it were to turn out that the beloved only possessed our measure and form!”221 
The ontological difference between God and creatures (and between human beings) is the 
fundamental safeguard for self-sacrifice that does not result in self-annihilation.
222
 
Whatever is being asked of the disciple in the spiritual journey it is decidedly not, in 
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Balthasar’s estimation, an exercise in self-annihilation. We are not asked to allow our 
individual significance to be somehow absorbed into God. Instead we are invited to 
participate with God in finding our own agency. The good news of the Gospel is real and 
alive in Balthasar’s spirituality. We are being saved, not absorbed. 
 While philosophical difference might not seem to be a self-evident theme in the 
Bible, Balthasar believes it is crucial. This relationship between theology, philosophy, 
and spirituality is evident in that Balthasar’s discussion of the mystics of the Christian 
church falls under the heading of Metaphysics in the Modern Age and “Metaphysics of 
the Saints.”223 Without a proper understanding of God and metaphysics, spirituality will 
degenerate any number of ways. In discussing the spiritual life, one must have a clear 
sense of the way in which God and creature relate, and this involves certain philosophical 
commitments. Even more, Balthasar mentions that metaphysics is crucial to 
understanding the kenotic theme: 
From Augustine via Benedict to Francis and Ignatius, this [yielding of self to 
divine love] remains the primal truth which, though unchanging in its essence, is 
constantly illumined in new ways. Nor can it stand indifferently beside 
metaphysics with the latter’s question as to the transcendence of reason; rather, it 
casts light on this very question and clarifies it from its own ultimate sublimity.
224
 
 
While this “primal truth” (which is simply the radical nature of Christian love) has 
remained, it sometimes became obscured in various ways. One of the positive effects of 
the Greek inheritance is that it encouraged eros and apatheia, a rigorous asceticism 
coupled with an urgent desire to connect with God. Balthasar applauds these early 
thinkers for keeping spirituality connected to theology. Indeed, Balthasar’s whole project 
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of theological aesthetics is based on the beauty of God drawing and shaping our desires. 
Yet one of the negative effects is that this cosmological approach leans toward the neo-
platonic idea of absorption, which does not allow much room for the human spirit to 
achieve freedom. 
 Balthasar affirms that Thomas Aquinas’s medieval synthesis marshaled the best 
of Christian antiquity while providing the conceptual materials needed to construct the 
real distinction between creature and Creator.
225
 Balthasar believes that Thomas’ reliance 
on the doctrine of the Trinity for metaphysics is crucial: 
The metaphysics of Thomas is thus the philosophical reflection of the free glory 
of the living God of the Bible and in this way the interior completion of ancient 
(and thus human) philosophy. It is a celebration of the reality of the real, of the all 
embracing mystery of being which surpasses the powers of human thought, a 
mystery pregnant with the very mystery of God, a mystery in which creatures 
have access to participation in the reality of God, a mystery which in its 
nothingness and non-subsistence is shot through with the light of the freedom of 
the creative principle, of unfathomable love.
226
 
 
The philosophical foundation for the difference between Persons of the Trinity ensures 
that God’s freedom and love remain un-coerced in relation to each other and the world. 
Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysics thus protects the very passion of God in his 
unfathomable self-giving love. 
 In addition to divine freedom, Thomas’s philosophical distinction also preserves 
creaturely love and freedom. According to Balthasar, the Creator’s relationship with 
creatures “is modeled on the archetypal otherness within God” which brings about “a 
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positive relationship to God.”227 Balthasar further asserts that Thomas’ trinitarian-
structured metaphysics protects human flourishing. This allowance and celebration of 
creaturely freedom found in Thomas 
is beyond the imagination of any non-Christian religion” (including Judaism and 
Islam), for wherever God (even in the person of Yahweh and Allah) can only be 
the One, it remains impossible to discover any satisfactory explanation of the 
Other. In these circumstances, philosophical reflection (which never truly 
occurred in Judaism or Islam) inevitably conceives the world, in its otherness and 
multiplicity, as a fall from the One, whose blessedness is only in itself.
228
 
 
But Balthasar also takes Christianity to task, judging it guilty of ignoring Thomas’s 
contribution and averring that this metaphysical lynchpin was lost by the inheritors of the 
Thomistic legacy. Christian theology and spirituality ended up departing from Thomas’s 
balance, resulting in in two dismal alternatives: placing reason over being (Scotus) or 
continuing the univocal identification of God with being (Meister Eckhart).
229
 The legacy 
of Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez inevitably end up leading to the emergence of  Kantian 
philosophy.
230
 The Kantian path privileges rationality and epistemology over the fullness 
of being. 
 In considering Meister Eckhart (the other side of this polarity), Balthasar gives a 
more mixed response.
231
 He sees Eckhart as an intensely radical Christian with authentic 
experience and a commitment to the kenotic motif (expressed as Gelassenheit). But 
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Eckhart’s prayerful and exuberant “worshipping heart” used philosophical and 
theological language that may have been overly confident, which encourages others to 
“misuse his words and insights for the purpose of its titanic idealism.”232 Balthasar’s 
main problem with Eckhart is not with his use of Gelassenheit per se, but his tendency to 
identify God with being leads to humanity becoming God themselves. Eckhart’s 
authentic experiences are used by others that follow his trajectory to blur or destroy the 
philosophical difference between Creator and creature. The real possibility of any 
authentic spirituality of self-surrender becomes a threat to human autonomy, for it leads 
to the flagrant promethean attempt at the dethronement of God.
233
  
 Consequently, for Balthasar, a poor understanding of philosophical difference is 
not just a minor, forgivable intellectual defect. He perceives disastrous consequences for 
any authentic vision of kenotic love.
234
 A metaphysics that can properly declare that God 
is Wholly Other and yet is oriented toward his creation in self-giving love is a crucial 
ingredient in the formulation of integrity and freedom of both God and creature. It is this 
philosophical assertion that makes room for the possibility of a healthy form of self-
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surrender. In Balthasar’s estimation, the importance of this position has been 
ineffectively grasped intermittently in the history of Christian thought.
235
 
The Scandal of the Gospel over Intellectual System 
 One possible misreading of Balthasar’s methodology would be to assume that he 
is intent on laying a philosophical substrate on top of biblical revelation. But Balthasar 
argues, in fact, for the opposite claim: the gospel, not philosophy, is what is normative. 
This means, then, that Balthasar’s thought cannot achieve an easy synthesis of various 
biblical, spiritual, or philosophical categories. To Balthasar this failure to achieve a 
perfect working system is not a shortcoming to be corrected but an attribute to be praised.  
 Another way to express the Gospel’s role in Balthasar’s spiritual vision is through 
the now-familiar theme of objective revelation over spiritual and ethical systems. The 
Gospel is fundamentally disruptive to human patterns of spirituality just as the scandal of 
the Incarnation and Cross disrupted religious belief systems. The Gospel is scandal. For 
Balthasar, part of this scandal relates to the unprecedented nature of the kenotic act that 
“forms the unique character of Jesus’s existence.” This unique kenotic character “cannot . 
. . be traced back to anything that is already known,” which means that humanity has 
difficulty receiving Jesus and he becomes continually a skandalon, a “‘stumbling 
stone’”236  
 This normative scandal is exhibited in his essay on “The Gospel as Norm and 
Critique of All Spirituality in the Church.”  
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Were the gospel a philosophy of religion for Everyman, or an abstract ethics for 
Everyman, then this hardness [of the gospel sayings] would be inappropriate. But 
the inherent form of the gospel requires that man follow Jesus by staking 
everything, with ultimate decisiveness, on the one card and abandoning the rest of 
the card game: ‘leaving everything’ without looking back, without laying down as 
a precondition a ‘synthesis’ between Jesus and saying farewell to those in one’s 
home, between Jesus and burying one’s own father, or between Jesus and 
anything else at all. . . . The criterion, the ‘canon,’ is that one does not make a 
synthesis.
237
 
 
Balthasar is saying that these hard gospel sayings cannot be properly integrated within an 
ethical-spiritual system, for if the call of gospel is systematized, it makes the act of 
abandoning family, for example, either universally applicable in everyone’s spiritual 
journey or not applicable at all and merely illustrative. This approach to God would 
mechanize the spiritual life. Either the disciple coldly detaches herself from her family in 
an almost mechanized technique of self-redemption using self-emptying as a spiritual 
tool to achieve salvation, or she continues on her way, rejecting any applicability of these 
sayings as part of the good news of the gospel.  
 Spirituality, for Balthasar, is not a plan of action to accumulate worldly wealth 
nor an attempt to somehow become something more than human. It is not an exercise in 
developing your natural talents, nor is it a system of practices designed to destroy the 
self. It is simply a choice to obey the disruptive word of God.
238
 Unlike in many other 
versions of Christian journey, for Balthasar this choice occurs at the beginning of the 
spiritual life. The process of “letting go” inherent in this choice is a form of kenotic 
relinquishment of the illusion of human-created systems. Humanity, through the choice to 
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follow Jesus, reciprocates analogously God’s own making room for creation. In the 
choice to follow after Jesus, the Christian makes space for God to define what humanity 
should look like and relinquishes her definitions of human fulfillment and happiness in 
exchange for God’s definitions. 
 Assenting to this invitation and opening oneself to have the form of Christ define 
you is not without effort. It is a death to an old web of meaning and a rebirth into a new 
one. Hence, the beginning of the journey has a negative, even painful, aspect to it. It is a 
true renunciation, a loss of moderating viewpoints not only about God, but also one’s 
understanding of the world, others, and the self. The spiritual journey begins in this 
thicket and the path can only be found “as a result of deliberate and perhaps wearying 
effort.”239 Instead of a passive “letting be,” Balthasar envisions that the kenotic activity of 
discipleship is something “which is to be actively grasped and carried out [and] must also 
be actively pursued.”240 The active choice to follow Christ is a major feature of 
Balthasar’s approach to spirituality. 
 Balthasar discusses the differences between the Rhineland mystics and Ignatius of 
Loyola to develop his idea of choice in the beginning of the spiritual life. What is made 
evident in Balthasar’s discussion of the Rhineland mystics and Ignatius of Loyola: “For 
the Rhineland mystics, abandonment came in at the end; Ignatius transfers it to the 
beginning.”241 In the Rhineland mystics, the implication is that self-abandonment is a 
mystical event or goal, an attempt to achieve a type of union with God.  
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 Two important consequences follow from locating spiritual abandonment at the 
beginning. First, this keeps Balthasar’s use of self-surrender motifs connected to 
voluntary concrete actions in the pursuit of obedience. Kenotic activity is a process in 
which we are invited to participate with God for the sake of ourselves and for others. In 
the Ignatian way, choice and kenotic activity are linked with the immediate participation 
in God through mission. This gives Christian discipleship a continual sense of God’s 
presence and invites the disciple to be involved in the practice of self-surrender under the 
directive of the Holy Spirit. 
 The second consequence of placing kenotic abandonment at the beginning is 
associated with choice. Balthasar highlights the way spirituality is fundamentally 
disruptive to human attempts at creating a system of self-salvation and is based on faith, 
arguing that: 
being carried out of oneself—which is faith, and is brought about by the love of 
Christ—is nothing else than a clearing of space in oneself for this love, a 
determination of one’s own existence, which allows itself to be conformed to the 
existence of the crucified in such a way ‘that our inclusion in the life of Christ 
does not only give us an outward direction, but penetrates us from within’.242 
At the outset of Balthasar’s spirituality is a decision to allow God to define reality and, 
through that, accept what God has for each individual, be it pain or pleasure, in the 
confidence that, through it all, God will bring the individual into a heightened sense of 
the real, including a more intense and empowered existence as a human being. 
 When viewed through the lenses of the scandal of the gospel and the 
abandonment of self-assessment, Christian perfection is relegated to the background of 
the spiritual journey. The task at the beginning of the spiritual journey is a choice to 
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reject these notions: “It is readiness as sacrifice—because Christian perfection consists in 
placing oneself at the disposal of God’s entire will and renouncing one’s own choice of a 
way of life.”243 Many spiritualities attempt to describe the Christian journey as an ascent 
to perfection. For Balthasar, perfection is already given at the outset as grace:  
Thus the soul in grace does not live in a state of indigence advancing toward 
fullness, but in a state of fullness radiating out into the poverty and darkness of 
this world . . . . All that was said about the essential constitution of the finite has 
become or the moment of no importance; for the just man lives by faith, that is, by 
the gift of eternal life. His acts are performed not as part of his striving toward 
perfection, but as proceeding from perfection.
244
 
 
The effect of this change in perspective is difficult to underestimate. It virtually 
eliminates a self-conscious scrutiny of activity and emotions, placing the focus on 
contemplating the gift-giving God.
245
 In this schema, the Christian begins the journey to 
God from a place of thankfulness and blessing, not human insufficiency, desire, or aching 
need. 
 Balthasar’s commitment to the scandalous nature of Christian spirituality and the 
rejection of a human-defined idea of perfection is what leads him to explore the tradition 
of the holy fool.
246
 The saints, as important as they are to Balthasar, suffer from a 
misinterpretation over the centuries. They become classified as heroes and become 
“separate candidates for sanctity from the existence of ordinary mortals.247 When heroism 
dominates the saintly narratives, the result is either to view grand acts of heroism as the 
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measure of the Christian life or to see the life of holiness as unattainable for the average 
Christian. Both of these problems are caused by human beings attempting to quantify and 
commodify the spiritual life. 
 So, where should Christians look to find an example of radical Christian existence 
without the desire for measurement? Following the “Metaphysics of the Saints,” 
Balthasar delves into the stories of Parzival, Don Quixote, Prince Myshkin of 
Dostoyevsky’s novel The Idiot, and the paintings of Georges Rouault. There is no single 
form of folly: sometimes it takes the form of a wisdom that is beyond this world, 
sometimes it is represented as a learned ignorance, sometimes it is used to represent the 
simple, the uneducated.
248
 The diversity of holy fools appeals to Balthasar’s 
understanding of mission and the uniqueness of each persons role in God’s drama. 
 But the archetype of the fool is particularly important for this study, not only 
because of the diversity of its manifestation but also because, in the retelling of the saint, 
a simple obedience and kenotic relinquishment (the central practices of true Christian 
spirituality) are often overshadowed in favor of the miraculous and heroic. In the 
narrative of the fool, the radical nature of kenosis, of letting all concern of reputation and 
human assessment fall away in simple yet outlandish decisions to love. The fool “can 
approach people no longer moved by fossilised forms of piety. This form of life is 
explicitly described as lying beyond apatheia, indeed as a crossing of the frontier of the 
measure proper to human nature.”249 When Balthasar describes the fool as “lying beyond 
apatheia,” he means that the fool, while echoing the motifs of kenosis that lie with the 
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Greek worldview, moves beyond the measurements of that system into a deeper realm: 
“He stands nearest to the saint, often nearer than the morally successful man preoccupied 
with his perfection.”250 The fool is not meant to replace the saint, but to recover that 
element of saintliness that Christianity has too quickly glossed over. 
 A particularly poignant example of the misrepresentation of sanctity for Balthasar 
can be found in Don Quixote. This story challenged the conventional appreciation of “the 
ideology of the heroic and gallant Christian knight . . . as the living analogy of the saint in 
his supernatural struggle for the Kingdom of God.”251 Yet, while making a mockery out 
of that idealized form of piety, Cervantes “was fully aware that it would be precisely in 
his hero that this out-of-date existence would survive as immortal foolishness. While Don 
Quixote is ‘no Christ-figure,’ it is precisely in his failure that Don Quixote “becomes the 
true patron saint of Catholic Action.”252 He “constantly preaches and practises love of 
enemies . . . . He preaches love on every occasion.”253 The simple perseverance of Don 
Quixote, his fidelity to poverty, chastity, and obedience juxtaposed with the spectacular 
failures of his actions reveal the depth of kenotic love in a unique way. “In short, Don 
Quixote is so much better a Christian because subjectively he makes no claim to sanctity, 
and because objectively it is never possible, at any moment or in any respect to count his 
ridiculous doings among the solemn deeds of God and Jesus Christ.”254 In sum, a type of 
self-surrender that is imbued with the foolishness of love motivates the fool in his purest 
form. In refusing to be measured, either by himself or by others, the fool is directly 
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combating the absorption and autonomy perspectives of spirituality. The fool is always 
well aware that he is not God and is not attempting to eradicate his creaturely identity. He 
is not seeking to erase his foolishness, only to expose it humbly to the free benevolence 
of God.  
 Another slightly different implication of Balthasar’s spirituality, especially in 
light of his reluctance to embrace a systematizing approach, is the question of human 
agency. The language of Christian perfection discussed above tends to entail within the 
Christian community a focus on individual holiness. The affirmation of human agency, 
while similar, is used in philosophical and theological circles to describe a general set of 
external conditions in which a human being is able to make free choices. Questions of 
human agency often come along with discourses on the nature of justice, community, and 
human rights. 
 The themes of universal human rights and social justice simply do not capture the 
imagination of Balthasar. He is so strongly attracted to the scandal and particularity of 
Christian revelation that his approach seems awkward and unusable for those intent upon 
securing universal human rights, dignity, or equality for the oppressed. Balthasar has no 
sense of urgency about creating clear progress toward equality and just societies, at least 
in terms of a universal language. However, it does not necessarily follow that Balthasar 
does not care about these aspects of life. The next two sections, on mission and 
discernment, offer a way to illustrate what rises up from the destruction of human 
systems and how Balthasar constructs a new answer to what human agency might mean. 
Mission and Human Agency 
111 
 
 It is essential to revisit the theme of mission to understand how Balthasar’s 
kenotic emphases interact with human agency. Chapter two discussed mission as it 
relates to Jesus as both human and divine but Balthasar also uses mission to describe 
human patterns of spirituality. Balthasar argues that “a human individual becomes a 
person, theologically, by being given a unique vocation and mission.”255  In fact, the 
deepest, most profound, most essential element of humanity is mission: 
All aspects of man’s creaturehood meet in the concept of mission: his mission to 
love and to serve, because love fulfills itself in service just as service fulfills itself 
in love; his distance from God and his nearness to God, because his condition as 
not-God finds its foundation and fulfillment in his condition of being at a remove 
from love, as the Son also experienced it is in his relationship with the Father, 
whereas his nearness to God reveals itself as a nearness of love and hence also of 
reverence and of service; his call to autonomous action and self-giving 
contemplation, because his action can be more autonomous as his contemplation 
is more self-giving and receptive, whereas his contemplation finds its purest 
expression when it is translated into action. Thus the concept of mission suffices 
to express the full measure of what man is; fulfillment of mission encompasses 
the whole concept of human perfection. It even replaces it, since human 
perfection is not in itself self-sufficient and purposeful; it stands in the service of 
the glorification of the love of the Trinity, which is the single ultimate purpose of 
creation and to which everything else has been ordered, including man’s 
perfection and his eternal happiness.
256
 
 
Note how Balthasar insists that every aspect of what humanity means coincides with 
mission. All the questions raised in this study—self-surrender, human fulfillment, 
autonomy, agency, conscience, Christian perfection, suffering, and joy—all are deeply 
present within this fundamental category of mission. 
 More precisely, then, mission is the dramatic transition from being an individual 
into being a theological person. Balthasar uses the term “individual” to refer to the 
natural state of humanity, the commonality all human beings share. An individual 
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achieves personhood through accepting and enacting his or her mission. As an 
ontological encounter mission comes directly from God to the individual. The implication 
here is that mission is not something that arises out of a constellation of natural talents; 
mission cannot be discovered by doing an inventory of strengths and weakness. Mission 
is the call of the gospel applied uniquely to each individual, with the intention of turning 
that individual into an empowered person in the deepest possible way. It is a specific and 
unrepeatable calling particular to every human being. 
 This understanding of mission also serves to guide and structure kenotic activity. 
The category of mission is so important that “even the factor of Christian mortification to 
the world stands under the more comprehensive sign of mission.”257 Mortification is a 
descriptive term for the kenotic motif in spirituality. In other words, the kenosis theme is 
sometimes made subordinate to mission because mission brings about personhood in a 
more comprehensive manner. The activity of self-surrender and the degree of self-
surrender will be different for each individual as he or she responds to and internalizes 
the story of the self that his or her mission offers. So mission is an all-encompassing term 
that opens up the possibility for the negative connotations of self-sacrifice to be related to 
the larger themes of self-discovery and agency.  
 One possible concern about Balthasar’s conceptions of agency, mission, kenosis, 
and personhood could be that kenotic spirituality cannot support a positive conception of 
self-love because it advocates self-surrender. If self-love is a necessary part of human 
flourishing and Balthasar’s kenotic spirituality denies self-love, then it could be argued 
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that Balthasar sabotages his manifest goal of human flourishing by denying self-love. 
Daphne Hampson, for example, argues that, while kenosis is an acceptable practice for 
men, it is damaging to women because they do not have a sense of self in the first 
place.
258
 There are two extreme views of self-love that need to be addressed to avoid 
absorption or autonomy. On the one hand, if self-love is rejected as tantamount to pride 
or egoism, it would seem that Christian spirituality would fall into the absorption mode of 
spirituality. Christian asceticism then becomes a vehicle for hatred of creaturely finitude. 
Carried to its full completion, this perspective becomes a vehicle for the destruction of 
the self—both spiritually and physically. 
 On the other extreme, if self-love becomes the arbiter of meaning for the 
definition of self, freedom, and love, then the Christian becomes closed off to 
experiencing love through others to the extent that human flourishing is defined by the 
individual rather than God or the community. The invitation to participate in God-gifted 
mission is lost and replaced by self-interest. Ironically, extreme self-love (egoism) results 
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in death of the self or disempowerment, even while those who follow this path see 
themselves as increasing in autonomy and power.  
  The ethicist Darlene Fozard Weaver recognizes these two extremes. It is not 
enough to merely accept self-love as part of the Christian life, but one must understand its 
relation to other forms of love: “love for God, self, and neighbor are dynamically inter-
related. The costs of failing to note these inter-relations are high. Unduly separating them 
risks the misconstruing them as competing objects of love.”259 As Weaver implies then, 
self-love cannot be considered apart from loving relationships with God and neighbor.  
Speculatively speaking, while Balthasar might agree with Weaver about the 
interconnectedness of the various forms of love, any attempt at promoting self-love is 
problematic for him for three reasons. First, because Balthasar stands solidly within the 
Christian tradition, he recognizes and affirms that the basic definitions of sin center upon 
pride and that self-love can easily spill over into something more sinister.
260
 He is 
hesitant to grant space to self-love lest it turn into egoism, which makes self-interest the 
normative guide of conduct. Thus, a theological approach that formalizes self-love runs 
the risk of disrupting the balance between God and creature that was established in the 
Incarnation. 
 Balthasar’s second concern about any privileging of self-love is that it is, in the 
end, untrustworthy and does not always lead to actual human flourishing: “Faith means to 
remain in perpetual contact with the source and to have no desire to seek one’s own 
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adventure. The greatest adventure after all is God’s redeeming action for the world in his 
Son, and if we follow the Son’s course we shall not run the risk of losing ourselves on the 
slippery paths of self-inverted love.”261 Self-love, when overemphasized, ends up 
betraying the self, seeking its own adventure, its own way to achieve flourishing based on 
its own desires. 
 The third reason that Balthasar is hesitant to emphasize self-love is because he 
simply believes personhood and true human flourishing is found in a network of 
relationships. Self-love simply loses all importance as a term “when I learn (in the Son) 
that I am a ‘good’ to him, affirmed by him; this is what guarantees my being and my 
freedom. It is only when I learn that I represent a ‘good’ and a ‘thou’ to God that I can 
fully trust in the imparted gift of being and freedom and so, affirmed from and by 
eternity, really affirm myself too.”262 In light of God’s objective pronouncement of our 
worth, the idea of self-love seems insignificant. In the end, self-love simply feels too 
individualistic and small to be of any use. True self-love is a byproduct of that moment 
when we truly understand what we mean to God. What Balthasar contends is that, within 
this kenotic spiritual framework, our identity is not threatened by the other, but realized 
in “a ‘we’ that transcends” self-love completely.263 
 Yet, if Balthasar contradicts or denigrates self-love, then he has also violated his 
principle of ontological difference; this would result in a universalizing of self-sacrifice. 
Weaver believes that, without a positive understanding of self-love, Christianity “may 
encourage unmitigated sacrifice on behalf of the neighbor, a sacrifice that mutilates the 
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identity of the person and does a disservice to the neighbor as well. As a contemporary 
account of self-love makes clear, to construe God, self, and neighbor as competing 
objects of love establishes false oppositions among them.”264 Self-hatred would 
undertake spiritual activity with the motivation of self destruction. This activity could 
mimic, at least superficially, the heroic deeds of the martyr or charity toward the neighbor 
but it would be, on the whole, motivated by hatred of self. Balthasar’s theology, though, 
would never advocate a mutilation of the person in self-sacrifice. Even with self-love 
remaining in the background it is simply not the case that his theology mutilates the 
human form. The trinitarian love and the Incarnation provide an alternative emphasis to 
self-love that prevents such a problem from arising. Balthasar can acknowledge the 
importance of self-love, yet he can acknowledge its very real dangers as well. Self-love 
alone is never the answer to the problem of achieving human agency. 
 In short, while Balthasar acknowledges the presence of a positive self-love and its 
role in our spiritual lives, he does not believe that there is any need to emphasize it. 
Instead it is to remain “unaccented” lest it turns into something more dangerous.265 This 
area of Balthasar’s theology needs more development. Balthasar does not formally deny 
the reality of self-love and, indeed, his concern for ontological difference would seem to 
support creaturely self-regard. Yet it seems as if he could have done more to explain how 
self-love is a positive aspect of the Christian life instead of leaving it unaccented.  
 Overall, however, Balthasar’s reluctance to make use of the terminology of self-
love frees the human person from looking inward to pursue God. In leaving behind a 
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preoccupation with self in exchange for a personalizing mission, Christian spirituality, in 
Balthasar’s approach, offers an opportunity for a deeper vision of individual agency. 
Each person will have a different path toward fulfillment, a different way of freely 
expressing that common imprint of Christ. As Balthasar states:  
the personal ‘idea’ of each individual finite freedom lies in the incarnate Son in 
such a way that each is given a unique participation in the Son’s uniqueness. His 
divinity, with its infinite freedom, permits this inexhaustible multiplication of 
what is once-for-all and unique; thus it also permits each individual freedom to 
fulfill itself in an utterly distinct manner within the realm of infinite freedom.
266
 
 
God has an “idea” and “name” for each one and has shaped beforehand a path to full 
agency for that person. This allows for a great deal of freedom in the spiritual journey. 
While admittedly the spiritual life is saturated in the life of Jesus Christ and must be 
shaped by him, what each follower does in a concrete situation could potentially be very 
different based on the leading of the Father in love. This model of spirituality gives 
context to Balthasar’s theology and is, on the whole, overlooked by many commentators 
that are unconvinced of his project. 
Discernment 
 
 Thus far I have argued that Balthasar’s theology and spirituality are linked 
organically through the encounter with the gospel. This allows for the consideration of 
the trinitarian and Christological elements of kenosis to flow into Balthasar’s spirituality. 
The gospel itself, as good news and hard sayings, prevents us from creating a system of 
progress that leads us to our own definitions of happiness and fulfillment. Inversely, it 
also precludes a system of relinquishments, self-sacrifices, and sufferings as inherent in 
Christian holiness. Instead, we are invited to relinquish judgments and live in a kenotic 
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state of indifference. The appreciation for mission provides Balthasar with a way of 
discussing the positive nature of the human spirit in his discourse on spirituality. Mission 
safeguards all that is valuable about the creature from alternative forms of spiritual 
journeys that end in dissolution of the person or alienation from the rest of humanity. 
 This final section will elaborate how Balthasar might see mission played out 
throughout the life of the Christian through the idea of discernment, or more specifically, 
discernment as the idea of living out mission. Without discernment, the kenotic elements 
of spirituality, even within the category of mission, would become oppressive. For 
Balthasar, “the metaphysics of indifference” is foremost “a doctrine of discernment” 
because a thoroughly Christian instantiation of indifference is always ordered toward “the 
personal decrees of the Holy Spirit.”267 When the disciple follows after Christ in a spirit 
of abandonment or disponibilité she is primarily in a state of active listening, a readiness 
to enact the very truths of God in her own life.
268
 Balthasar believes this perspective on 
emptying avoids the rigidity of the Greek and Asian techniques of self-emptying, which 
extinguish the self rather than preparing the self for action and empowerment. 
 There are many activities and attitudes that develop this ability to be available to 
the personal decrees of the Spirit. Yet, Balthasar, like Barth, wanted to avoid techniques 
of simple progression in the spiritual life. In other words, the process of spiritual 
discernment seeks out ways to mute our own clamoring fears or desires and to recognize 
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God’s call. In relation especially to self-sacrifice, discernment will be absolutely crucial 
as a qualifying tool to aid Christians in the employment of kenosis in their lives. As I 
have noted above, the Christian obedience to the gospel involves hard sayings and good 
news. Or, in Melanie Barrett’s more experiential interpretation:  
attunement to Christ instills two dispositions in the believer, one unpleasant, 
arduous and difficult, and the other joyful, hopeful, and trusting . . . . For the 
believer, this unity of dispositions, one positive and one negative, results in a 
variegated emotional life, one that alternates between joy and suffering, between 
felt nearness to God and felt distance from God, and between exuberance and 
dejection.
269
  
 
Balthasar’s spirituality is suffused with drama. We experience the gamut of life, and any 
spirituality must validly embrace that, especially if this Christian life is to be based on 
Jesus’s life and ministry. In discernment, the Christian learns to respond to God in the 
midst of these dispositions, either to embrace joy or pain. Balthasar makes the following 
point about how Jesus used discernment: 
When is it time for Jesus to hide from his enemies and avoid them, and when is it 
time to confront them and surrender into their hands? He knows these times by 
always looking to the Father . . . . In making the decisions required by the needs 
of the hour, the Christian and the Church must ponder and reflect, of course: but 
at the same time they must look up to the obedient Son with humble entreaty, so 
that, through him, they may find the will of God here and now.
270
 
 
In this passage Balthasar’s nuanced and subtle approach to self-surrender has Jesus 
leaving all his activity up to the Father. This underlying disposition is kenotic, yet, in 
terms of concrete situations, kenosis can appear either as a confrontation or as a 
surrender. It is not automatically one or the other, underscoring the fact that Balthasar 
does not see authentic spirituality as a passive resignation to suffering or oppression.  
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 Indeed, Balthasar is not offering the Christian a life only of suffering and death 
and obedience. These things are never goods in themselves; rather, they are determined to 
be the appropriate action undertaken in love, if and when the Holy Spirit prompts it. On 
the other hand, Balthasar refuses to base his entire spirituality on the idea of liberation or 
emancipation. In Balthasar’s lifetime, liberation theology was in its beginning stages. He 
recognized many good things within the spirit of early liberation theology but his main 
concern was that if liberation theology focuses solely on fighting structural injustice, it 
could miss the possibility that God might be asking for a different response.
271
  
 Balthasar focuses on a number of spiritual activities that support a mature ability 
to discern right action. Two that I wish to highlight in light of my project are a 
contemplative reading of the scriptures and participation in the Eucharist. These two 
practices bring “what pertains to the Son” through “the work of the Spirit to form the 
mystical body of Christ by spiritually universalizing the historical Christ.”272 The kenotic 
disposition is present in Balthasar’s approach to reading Scripture contemplatively.273 
The Christian does not go to the Bible in search of a specific answer, but to learn how to 
listen: 
The Christian contemplates holy scripture, not insofar as it is man’s word, but as 
God’s word . . . for scripture is not some systematic wisdom: it is an account of 
God’s meeting with men . . . in contemplating scripture we learn how to listen 
properly, and this listening is the original wellspring of all Christian life and 
prayer.
274
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This act of contemplating scripture places us in communication with the Divine. Yet, in 
Balthasar’s typical fashion, communication with the Divine is a thoroughly human 
process. Because of the Incarnation our interactions with God can never leave the 
physical, creaturely world behind. The senses and the imagination become very important 
in the process of discernment and especially in approaching scripture.
275
 “In 
contemplation, just as we can never leave the Lord’s humanity behind us, neither can we 
get ‘beyond’ the word in its human form. It is in the humanity that we find God, in the 
world of sense that we find the Spirit.”276 Balthasar asks the Christian to “be in the stable 
at Bethlehem . . . go along on the flight into Egypt . . . place an order with Jesus the 
carpenter . . . and so on.”277 The ability to discern right actions now comes from a 
constant immersion in the scriptures, forming our imaginations through the Holy Spirit, 
who shows us the will of the Father.
278
 
 The Eucharist is another important practice for spiritual discernment. The 
Eucharist is a vital step in the progression of the kenotic motif begun in the Incarnation. 
Balthasar provocatively claims that “only the Eucharist really completes the 
Incarnation.”279 The Eucharist extends the kenotic economy into the very hearts and souls 
of humanity in a sacramental manner.
280
 It is the “closest approach to God”281As Kevin 
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Mongrain has argued so well, Balthasar is not necessarily interested in abstract 
explanations of the Eucharist but more in the actual reception of it, accepting the mystery 
surrounding it.
282
 It is a mystical enactment of the kenosis of God through Christ for the 
enrichment of the disciple who, in giving thanks for God’s kenosis, offers up a self-
sharing love toward others and back to God. 
 The Eucharist, since it is an extension of the kenotic economy, offers Christians a 
way to place themselves in the drama with Christ. In this manner we take up, with Christ, 
a eucharistic, self-giving attitude toward the Father, since “the Eucharist is directed to 
God the Father.”283 Not only does the body of Christ mystically nourish us and restore the 
Christian to spiritual health but, in participation of the Eucharist, the Christian takes on 
Jesus’s own kenotic attitude of love toward the Father. This watchful and thankful 
posture toward the Father is the beginning of discernment. 
 One final comment is important to understand discernment’s place in the interplay 
of a kenotic spirituality: interpersonal human relations. Balthasar’s kenotic vision of 
reality will need to engage concrete situations in life if it is to be meaningful for 
Christians. One way to address this relationship between persons is with ethical 
reflection, i.e., normative guidance or principles that a person can then apply to various 
situations in order to ensure certain values are respected and upheld. In the ethical arena, 
how would a person, shaped by the kenotic love of God, discern right actions toward a 
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neighbor? If kenosis forms the foundation for all relationships, then Balthasar can argue 
that “the Son’s self-surrender is the most definite reality possible, and every ethical norm 
governing man’s concrete action (individually and socially) is only the proclaiming of 
this infinite will of God for a finite situation.”284 This is a demanding ethical code “where 
the thought of necessity, justice, and the thought of balanced settlement cease.”285  It is 
impossible to overemphasize the theme of excessive love in Balthasar’s theology, and it 
is especially crucial for understanding his view of ethics. Love is a required element in all 
forms of kenotic activity but Balthasar allows for radical kenosis to be moderated by the 
concrete realities of the moment: 
One can permit self-giving in good conscience only when one is ready, for one’s 
own part, to give freely without counting the cost. On this spiritual level, the good 
stands as norm over the giver as well as the [sic.] over the recipient (but who is 
also ready for his part to be given in return), and it governs the free consciences of 
both.
286
   
 
I interpret this quotation to be an admission that, if we are not able to give freely or with 
full knowledge, we are in a potentially dangerous situation. Self-sacrifice is not a good in 
itself that justifies the violation of our consciences. It takes place within a personal 
encounter, primarily with God, who directs us and guides us. While we model our lives 
off of the radical love of God we also need to discern in practical terms how to approach 
any given situation: 
The Christian is fundamentally a man who has been dispossessed. He lives for 
God and his fellow men because he knows that he is not the author of his own existence; 
thus, in gratitude for his life, he must lead a life of thanksgiving. He gladly does what he 
                                                          
 
284
 Balthasar, TD 2, 281-282. 
 
285
 Balthasar, GL 7, 140. 
 
286
 Balthasar, Epilogue, 69. 
124 
 
can and gives what he has. In practical terms there is probably a limit to this openness to 
God and our fellowmen: we need a personal area in which to recharge our batteries so 
that we can return to the field of action and expend ourselves once again. But spirituality 
and existentially this openness has no limits.”287  
So, while he feels the Christian remains fundamentally open to self-giving, 
Balthasar also acknowledges our creaturely finitude. The human subject needs to 
recognize the times when he or she needs to withdraw. This is not selfishness or egoism; 
it is healthy self-love and also love for the other. These admissions, though, are 
relatively sparse. Balthasar does not often call for moderation, for the recharging of 
batteries, or withdrawal from self-sacrifice. In fact, it is the opposite. Usually he pushes 
the extremes of self-sacrifice, encouraging Christians to continually and meaningfully 
divest themselves of everything. The imbalance in his work is sometimes problematic 
and leads to misunderstandings. In attempting to show the limitless power of kenotic 
love, Balthasar often forgets to qualify his statements. This can make him appear guilty 
of promoting a form of self-annihilation, when really it is a confidence in the divine 
grace of God and his ultimate goal for all people to walk in the full power of kenotic 
relations. 
Conclusion 
 Balthasar’s spirituality and theology are connected to the objective medium of the 
gospel. The kenotic patterns found in the gospel become the normative and objective 
pattern for the spiritual journey. The elements of Balthasar’s spirituality described within 
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this chapter were the necessity of philosophical difference, the rejection of spiritual and 
ethical systems in favor of the scandal of the gospel, the promotion of individualizing 
mission as the central feature of spirituality, and the role of discernment in helping the 
Christian navigate the difficulties of human relationships in a sinful world. The idea of 
self-sacrifice, in light of these emphases, becomes nuanced; Balthasar is always careful to 
maintain the delicate balance between the hard sayings and sufferings that the Christian 
life entails alongside the liberation, joy, freedom that Christ offers. This answer may not 
satisfy all those who see kenosis as an oppressive mechanism that denigrates the self. Yet 
Balthasar offers an alternative vision in which kenosis is the only way to achieve true 
agency. He rejects common forms of measuring agency in favor of the radical nature of 
love that the Gospel demands.  
 This study has traced the meaning of kenosis within Balthasar’s corpus. I have 
argued that kenotic love is a comprehensive and normative theme that Balthasar employs 
in all the main areas of his writings. I have also shown that he intentionally employs 
kenosis, grounded in divine love, to preserve creaturely agency. I described how 
Balthasar sees the problem of sin damaging humanity’s relationship with God and other 
humans. In Balthasar’s understanding, human systems of religion other than Christianity 
responded in two possible extreme ways. The first used kenosis without love to annihilate 
the self. This religious impulse was often accompanied by a metaphysical belief that the 
goal of the spiritual journey was an absorption of the self into the divine. The other 
response, in reaction to the destruction in the first extreme, rejected kenosis as a spiritual 
pattern and understood the divine as a competitor for true agency. This response is an 
attempt to secure freedom by taking power. I argued that, for Balthasar, this dilemma was 
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solved in the Incarnation, which restored kenosis to the proper home within triune love, 
and that, through that restoration, kenosis was revealed to be a vehicle for pursuing a 
personalizing mission for each and every human being.   
 For Balthasar, true kenosis is never the obliteration of the self in an ontological 
sense but only in the sense of an abasement toward the Divine in love. Were God himself 
not loving, this would jeopardize the creature’s ability to achieve agency. This is why the 
Incarnation has a central position in Balthasar’s theology. He understands the Incarnation 
as a definitive act of love from God that establishes, once and for all, that human beings 
need not strive for some type of godlike autonomy; that their very finitude is of deep 
value. 
In relationship to the Incarnation I discussed how Balthasar’s particular 
connection of Christology with drama and spirituality opened up a new fertile ground for 
the motif of kenosis. Since Balthasar believed the Incarnation was the definitive 
revelation of the divine life, Balthasar deduced that the trinitarian life itself must be 
kenotic in nature as well. This primal kenosis within the Trinity shapes Balthasar’s 
metaphysics and ultimately provides the framework from which he works out a pattern in 
which God’s freedom and agency do not conflict with human agency but presuppose the 
possibility of accepting every free act of creatures from a standpoint of love. This divine 
self-giving love, when impressed upon the human being, provides a mission, a way to 
become more than a single individual and become a theological person within the 
community of saints. 
The kenotic theme is widely acknowledged in the secondary literature as an 
important component of Balthasar’s theology, but there is not a sustained treatment of the 
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subject.
288
 This full-length study of kenosis offers a thematic entrance into Balthasar’s 
works. It provides a fresh way of understanding the main themes of Balthasar’s thought. 
Second, there is an interest in the idea of kenosis in postmodern constructive 
theologies.
289
 The kenotic motif appears to offer postmodern theologians the ability to 
avoid some of the grasping for power that they see operating in modern theology. The 
human desire for a system and epistemological certainty produced theologies that ignored 
the dark side of human culture (sin) and were also closed off toward the wildness of 
biblical revelation (grace). In particular, philosophers and theologians such as Oliver 
Davies, Graham Ward, Emmanuel Levinas, Edith Wyschogord, and Jean Luc-Marion 
have all taken up kenotic themes in their own theologies and philosophies. Balthasar is an 
important conversation partner for those continuing to consider kenosis in postmodern 
theology. 
Third, this study answers the concern in the various “theologies of liberation” that 
focusing on kenosis as a definitive descriptor for the spiritual life means encouraging 
disempowered and marginalized people to remain in bondage.
290
 Balthasar, I have 
argued, clearly makes use of the kenotic motif with the intent of preserving human 
agency—which may include seeking liberation—and his thought offers a corrective to a 
particular strand of postmodernism that discards kenotic expression completely. His 
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usage of discernment and mission in spirituality provides a space in which kenotic 
practice could be a spiritually appropriate response to oppression and injustice. 
Balthasar’s powerful and creative approach to kenosis is both theologically rich 
and spirituality sensitive. While some aspects of his thought are perhaps overstated and 
others unaccented, his work offers theologians a wealth of possibilities for the careful and 
powerful usage of the radical self-offering of God and the radical calling to self-giving 
discipleship that the gospel portrays. 
 I began this dissertation by placing Balthasar’s kenosis within the context of the 
contemporary problem of human agency. I highlighted some of the challenges that came 
from feminist discourse about the topic. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a pioneer in American 
feminism, famously said, “Self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice.”  This 
sense that self-development and self-sacrifice are at odds with each other is a significant 
theme in contemporary culture and also in particular, within feminist discourse. In 
Christian discourse, when this feminist sentiment appropriately labels abusive power 
structures within Christian rhetoric, the idea of self-development being antithetical to 
self-sacrifice critiques spiritualities that focus on self-sacrifice as being patriarchal. In the 
introduction I mentioned the work of Daphne Hampson as one example. There is indeed 
an element of this quotation that rings true for those who find themselves victims of the 
powerful in a way that threatens agency. But what I think I’ve shown in Balthasar’s 
writings is that agency and self-sacrifice are not mutually exclusive but mutually enhance 
one another.  
 In what follows, I wish to offer a cursory speculative envoi to the dissertation by 
suggesting possible connections between Balthasar’s theology and others who make use 
129 
 
of kenosis in the contemporary situation. The purpose of this speculative process is not to 
be exhaustive or even representative. It is merely an exercise in speculation on how 
Balthasar’s work might interact with more contemporary voices that could assist 
Christian theologians and ethicists as they make use of kenotic language.  
 In Saints and Postmodernism the Jewish philosopher, Edith Wyschogrod, argues 
that in the postmodern situation, moral philosophy must take its cue from the narrative 
lives of saints that practice “radical altruism.”291 Wyschogrod believes that moral theory 
at its best is a deeply deficient tool to produce ethical action in our contemporary 
situation. At its worst, moral theory is susceptible to being used to inscribe violence and 
power into a grand narrative of “reason” that obscures radical altruism.292  
 If moral theory obscures radical altruism it is the saint that reveals its allure and 
motivates concrete moral action. Wyschogrod believes that saintly lives are to be 
interpreted not according to a “normative discourse . . . but much more like interpreting a 
musical theme.”293 Balthasar, too, has his love of musical references yet this is more than 
just a passing comment. For both Wyschogrod and Balthasar, the musical theme hints at a 
moral requirement, something that is not just to be intellectually assimilated on the 
theoretical level, but performed. Moral theory by itself tends to lack this allure to act 
morally. The narratives of the saints provide this moral invitation that grasps the human 
being, not merely at an intellectual level, but at a performative level. 
 Both Wsychogrod and Balthasar desire to move beyond traditional hagiographical 
methods of interpreting saintly lives and both see the saint primarily in terms of a 
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powerful activity of self-donation. Balthasar refers this activity of self-donation by many 
names throughout his work but the notions of kenotic love, self-surrender and self-
sacrifice are the predominant themes. Wyschogrod deems it “radical altruism.”294 
Wyschogrod distinguishes her view from the “common sense” view of altruism. 
Common sense altruism is in danger of seeing the Other as a way to fulfill the self’s 
desires. The practice of common sense altruism in results in hierarchical modes, for 
example, helping close relatives first over those with greater need.
295
 This criticism of 
common sense altruism contains parallels Balthasar’s own scant usage of self-love within 
his kenotic framework. The common sense usage of altruism is ordered by some measure 
of self-interest. If that self-interest becomes the driving force of self-sacrifice, then the 
relationship with the Other (God or human) is merely instrumental in the self’s grasping 
for wholeness. Wyschogrod forcefully states that “social theories do not measure 
altruism but altruism measures social theories.”296 This is a serious challenge to those 
who wish for a more measured interpretation of self-sacrifice that fits within a larger 
social theory. Balthasar and Wyschogrod are both extremely careful in preventing that 
from happening in their own work and instead demand a radical form of moral action. 
 Yet there is a significant difference between the two thinkers. Wyschogrod 
reduces the saintly life to the practice of radical altruism and jettisons the spiritual, 
theological, and mystical contexts in which these saints operated. Take, for example, 
Wyschogrod’s definition of saint: 
one whose adult life in its entirety is devoted to the alleviation of sorrow (the 
psychological suffering) and pain (the physical suffering) that afflicts other 
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persons without distinction of rank or group or, alternatively, that afflicts sentient 
beings, whatever the cost to the saint in pain or sorrow. On this view theistic 
belief may but need not be a component of a saint’s belief system.297 
 
This definition has similarities to Balthasar’s conception of sainthood. Saints are willing 
to suffer for the sake of others. In Christian terms, saints are even willing to be damned 
for others. But Wyschogrod’s claim that the act of self-sacrifice can be divorced from the 
belief system of the saint would be problematic for Balthasar. The reason the saint 
undertakes the life of self-emptying is because of their beliefs, and the divine protects 
that act of self-surrender with his own prior act. To claim that theological motivations are 
superfluous to understanding radical altruism appears reductionistic.  
 In addition, many saints did not always attempt to alleviate the pain of others but 
instead to find a connection to God within their pain. Wyschogrod’s focus on alleviating 
pain seems too simplistic; her sense of psychological or spiritual pain is a right and true 
admonishment. It is certainly not necessary to have a theological justification for self-
surrender, but it is a significant type of motivator for a large number of saints and, 
historically speaking, the cultivation of saints has occurred within theistic contexts. 
Wyschogrod divorces mystical language from the language of altruism. Her 
dismissiveness of the mystical and theological in saintly lives obscures the activity of the 
Divine kenosis which inspired them. The Divine is part of the musical score that leads to 
the practice of radical altruism.  
 Another important thinker is Sarah Coakley, a Christian feminist theologian. Her 
collection of essays, entitled Powers and Submissions is a particularly relevant attempt 
toward a contemporary Christian feminist rehabilitation of kenosis. Coakley appreciates 
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the movement of secular feminism but believes a crucial gift that Christian feminists can 
offer their secular counterparts is a reconstruction of the idea of submission and self-
surrender. She says in her first essay of the book, “it will be the burden of this essay, 
then, to offer a defence of some version of kenōsis as not only compatible with feminism, 
but vital to a distinctively Christian manifestation of it, a manifestation which does not 
eschew, but embraces, the spiritual paradoxes of ‘losing one’s life in order to save it.’”298 
Coakley later defines her version of the “bewildering number of evocations” of kenosis 
as “power-in-vulnerability.”299 While kenosis needs to be refined and clarified, Coakley 
is an example of a theologian operating from a feminist standpoint that believes kenosis 
is part of the central mystery of Christian salvation.  
 Coakley, like Balthasar, utilizes Christian spirituality to describe the kenotic event 
of love. Coakley believes that it is through contemplative prayer that kenosis becomes a 
“special form of ‘vulnerability’ [that] is not an invitation to be battered; nor is its silence 
a silencing. . . . By choosing to ‘make space’ in this way, one ‘practises’ the ‘presence of 
God’ – the subtle but enabling presence of a God who neither shouts nor forces, let alone 
‘obliterates.’”300 Kenosis forms the practice of making space for the other in love. This 
making space does not have to come with the cost of remaining silent or being battered. 
 Coakley’s emphasis and interpretation of the Phillippians passage of Scripture 
moves in a different direction than Balthasar’s, however. She sees the kenosis as related 
to human actions of Jesus rather than the emptying being a “precondition of the earthly 
life.” This distinction echoes Balthasar’s believe that there is not a sense in which divine 
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attributes have to be stripped away in order for the Son to become incarnate. But 
Balthasar believes that the Divine is already kenotic, already emptying, so that Jesus’ 
human activity is mirroring the prior Trinitarian activity.  
 Coakley and Balthasar both share a desire to move away from philosophical 
questions on the two natures of Christ and move into a narrative mode in which Jesus’ 
vulnerability is construed as a strength. However, Balthasar still retains an essentialism in 
regard to gender that would typify weakness as a feminine trait, albeit, a trait of positive 
value, not one of detriment. Coakley rightly argues that these typifications result in some 
problematic understandings of kenosis. In fact, one might argue that Balthasar, in 
describing receptivity and submission as feminine traits, yet asking all Christians to 
participate in them, might be attempting to evacuate his own masculinist guilt. This is of 
course a speculative statement, but is grounded in some real concerns raised by Coakley. 
Balthasar simply did not have a contemporary awareness of the influence of gender on 
theological statements. It is indeed a disjunction that others have noticed. Coakley’s 
observations on gender and power provide a way to further refine Balthasar’s theology of 
kenotic love in ways that are more nuanced in relationship to gender and power dynamics 
in the world. 
 The last theologian to be considered in this series of speculations of kenosis and 
Balthasar’s theology is Sallie McFague, who has had a distinguished career as a 
Protestant feminist theologian. In particular I wish to focus on her recent book, Blessed 
are the Consumers: Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint. This work is 
structured to address two contemporary issues: first world consumer culture and the 
destruction of the earth as a result of that consumption. McFague takes the idea of 
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kenosis, found within the lives of saints (in particular she uses John Woolman, Simone 
Weil, and Dorothy Day) to argue that Christian discipleship is directly opposed to 
capitalist consumer culture. Like Balthasar, she envisions Christianity’s most vital 
expression (found in the saints) to be radical self-giving love. McFague wants to reframe 
Christian discipleship to move in the opposite direction of Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s 
notion that “self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice.” Instead McFague 
argues that the “goal of human life” moves “from self-fulfillment to self-emptying.”301 
McFague takes the similar empahsis found in Balthasar on radical self-giving and 
interprets it within a global framework and the very real consequences for our world. 
Balthasar’s own context did not quite recognize the dangers inherent in human usage of 
the earth’s resources although he did recognize the alienation and individualization of 
modern industrial society. The underlying idea found in McFague that extends the 
meaning of the kenosis motif is that kenosis helps Christians to enact practices that result 
in care for the Earth and for the other by restraining impulse in contemporary society to 
find the agency of the self tied to purchases and consumption of resources.  
 McFague’s last chapter in particular lays out a kenotic theology to provide 
rationale for why Christians should be concerned with the limited resources and 
destruction of the environment. McFague argues that “A kenotic theology is therefore an 
incarnational theology, a theology that focuses unapologetically on ‘food,’ the lowliest, 
most basic need shared by all living beings . . .but is a theology that begins with need.”302 
Yet, McFague is not avoiding the divine in order to focus solely on ethical concerns. She 
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goes on to say that “this model suggests that all flesh, all matter, is included within God 
(as God’s ‘body’) but that God is not limited to this body, to matter. Here, God is 
understood to be ‘more than’ the body, more than the world, but intimately, radically, and 
inclusively identified with it.”303 This connection with food and this argument that matter 
is part of God’s body is foreign to Balthasar’s conception. I suspect that Balthasar would 
see this mode of thought as a blending of the real distinction between creator and creature 
that Balthasar worked so hard to maintain in his theology. Yet, McFague’s suggestion 
that God is bound up with the fate of the earthly “in a network of physicality, 
vulnerability, and need” is not biblically or theologically sound. It collapses divine 
kenosis into a complete powerlessness and is in danger of losing the difference between 
the creature and creator. Although McFagues’s notion of a “universal self” would cause 
Bathasar some concern, if we let this radical language stand and interpret it in an 
apophatic manner similar to what was suggested in Chapter Three, it might allow 
Christians to truly grasp the value of the created order, something that Balthasar was very 
concerned about in his own way. 
 McFague’s approach offers value in that she frames ecological and consumeristic 
concerns in terms of very real and necessary Christian spiritual practices. We are 
systematically destroying our world and we are unwilling to accept the effects of the 
capitalist system on our souls and the souls of our brothers and sisters. McFague also 
improves upon Balthasar in the area of religious dialogue. It holds some value as well in 
her willingness to extend the dialogue with other religious traditions in the hopes of a 
more inclusive and cooperative approach to caring for the earth. Balthasar’s arguably 
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Christian triumphalist reading of the ideas of autonomy and absorption as errors inherent 
within the other world religions religions is problematic. These are two areas in which 
Balthasar did not provide a great deal of input.   
 Nevertheless, my one main initial criticism of McFague’s work in this book is her 
doctrine of God. In describing God almost exclusively in terms of weakness with little 
disconnect from the earth, she threatens to undo some of the most important aspects of 
Christian theology: the belief in a God who creates from freedom, and through that 
freedom, gives himself willingly to those who rejected him. God’s divine self-surrender 
is not just part of the world process but a freely given gift.  
 Wyschogrod, Coakley, and McFague provide a sampling of the important ways 
that kenotic language can retain its biblical and theological center and bear fruit within 
contemporary theologians’ scholarly work. Wychogrod’s work highlights the saintly and 
the ethical. Coakley highlights the issue of gender and spiritual practice. McFague 
expands kenosis to include a response to ecological concerns. Balthasar’s own work in 
kenotic discourse is richly varied and provides an important source for contemporary 
theologians concern with forming new ways to understand God’s divine self-gift and the 
human response.  
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